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Theories of penal jurisdiction to try individuals for violations of the
laws and customs of war have evolved slowly and painfully through centuries
of human experience. This paper presents a brief history of that evolution
and attempts to assess the practical value of the resulting wisdom in today's
world.
Jurisdiction is defined as the competence to prosecute and punish viola-
tors of the laws of war. The term "violators of the laws of war" includes
those accused of crimes against peace and crimes against humanity as well as
war crimes and conspiracy to commit such crimes as defined in Article six of
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the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.
The meaning of the label "war" changes from time to time and from context
to context and is an integral part of the evolution of jurisdictional theory.
In looking at past conflicts, the determination of the world community at the
time in question will be given substantial weight in deciding whether the laws
of war applied. Deference to experience, however, will not be allowed to limit
the range of inquiry concerning solutions to current problems.
Kany types of sanctions other than individual criminal responsibility
have been used in an attempt to enforce the laws and customs of war. It is
not within the scope of this paper to discuss at length such sanctions as re-
prisals and public opinion which have been more or less effective in some cases.
Such sanctions will be discussed in those instances in which they relate to
the effective application of jurisdictional theory.
A. VALUES TO BE PROTECTED 3Y SANCTIONS AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF THE LArfS OF rfAR
There is no question but that war is a breakdown of minimum world order

and an indication that international control procedures have failed. Just
because there has been a breakdown in minimum world order, however, does not
mean that there cannot be a "retreat position" concerning the conduct of the
war itself. There are still human and material values which need not be
damaged nor destroyed and may be protected by enforcement of the law of war.
As stated in a recent treatise i "The historic function of the laws of war has
been to impose limitations upon international violence in the common interest
3
of the community of states."-^
It must be recognized, however, that to stress the protection of human
and material values to the exclusion of military reality would be self-defeat-
ing and inevitably result in greater destruction of the values sought to be
protected. The complimentary doctrines of ""military necessity" and "humanity"
historically are used to express the compromise necessary in real world situa-
tions. Professors McDougal and Feliciano set out the required balance suc-
cinctly I
Each territorial community has a most direct and immediate interest
in maintaining its security, that is, in protecting the integrity
of its fundamental bases of power and the continued, functioning of
its internal social processes from the obstruction of unlawful vio-
lence. Each such community has consequently an interest in authority
to exercise the force indispensable and appropriate for maintaining
or re-establishing its security. Each territorial polity has at the
same time an interest in reducing to minimal levels the destruction
of values, both of itself and others, that attends such efforts,
5
The "humanity" side of the equation includes material values as well as
human values and some that are difficult to catagorize. Obviously the most
Important value to be protected is life itself, followed closely by the pre-
vention of human suffering and the preservation of human dignity. A specific
list of values protected by the laws of war and enforced by many kinds of
sanctions, including criminal sanctions against individual violators, could go
on indefinitely and vary depending on the value determinations of the individ-
uals and states. It should be obvious to everyone, however, that hostilities

must end sometime and intercourse between the belligei~ents re-established
.
Consequently, an essential value to be preserved is at least enough good faith
between the parties to leave undamaged a basis for a return to peace, short
of total annihilation of one or both sides,
Humanitarianism encompasses the basic belief that non-coercive, rather
than coercive, practices are best. Even in a situation in which force is
being used, excessive use of force and the consequent unnecessary destruction
of values can and should be prevented. McDougal and Feliciano place humani-
tarianism in context!
When conceived ... as one manifestattion of a profound preference —
however justified in terms of religion, secular philosophy, soci-
ology, psychology, or otherwise — for the shaping and sharing of
values by non-coercive, rather than coercive, modes, the principle
of humanity may be seen to be a basic postulate of any international
law of human dignity.'
B. NECESSITY FOR APPLYING SANCTIONS DIRECTLY AGAINST INDIVIDUALS
International law has operated traditionally between states, and individ-
uals were touched by international law only derivatively through one or more
states. There is nothing inherent in the individual, however, to make him
unsuitable as a subject of international law, especially international crim-
inal law.
The essence of a crime in any jurisdiction is that the act injures society
in addition to any injury that may occur to one or more individuals. Piracy
has long been considered a crime under international law, and it has been uni-
versally conceded that any state could seize a pirate for trial and punish-
D
ment. Violations of the law of war include acts that are prohibitod in every
state (murder, rape, etc.) as well as others that are especially related to
war and the maintenance of peace. However, all share the common fault of
injuring society in general. In the international sphere the concept of

society Is simply broader.
With the exception of the laws of war, violations of international law
by persons in the service of the state have been imputed to and considered
9
violations by the state. Even so, individuals have been held responsible
and punished for war crimes. The individuals so tried have usually been mem-
bers of political, military, or economic elites of defeated powers, but the
objectives have not differed greatly from purposes for which criminal justice
10
is administered in municipal systems. The major task in the international
sphere is implementation i
Perhaps few will doubt that the present corpus of authoritative
myth permits the punishment of individual persons responsible for
impermissible recourse to violence, and that the real problem is
creating appropriate international institutions and sustaining
perspectives and dispositions of effective power for the imple-
mentation of authority.
^
Various defenses, such as superior orders and acts of state, have been
raised, which, if extended to the ultimate degree, would render individuals
immune from punishment. The tribunals convened at the end of World War II,
at least, refused to accept such pleas as a complete defense and applied the
well-established municipal criminal law principle requiring that the criminal
intent of the defendant be established as an essential element of the crime.
If the goals of sanctions against violations of the laws of war are
deterrence and repression of violations, it would appear that such sanctions
would have to apply directly against individuals. States and state agencies
are made up of individuals and operate only through individuals. It is not
only conceivable but quite probable that individuals in a position to affect
state policy would be able to remain relatively safe during hostilities and
accumulate enough personal wealth to live comfortably despite the outcome of
the hostilities and regardless of the sanctions taken against their state.
If this state of affairs is considered probable, or even possible, no

combination of sanctions against violations of the laws of war can be expected
to be reasonably effective unless criminal sanctions apply directly against
the individuals responsible. As stated in the Judgment of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
j
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the actions
of sovereign States, and provides no punishment for individuals? and
further, that where the act in question is an act of state, those
who carry it out are not personally responsible, but are protected by
the doctrine of the sovereignty of the state. In the opinion of the
Tribunal, both those submissions must be rejected. That interna-
tional law imposes duties and liabilities upon Individuals as well
as upon states has long been recognized.... Crimes against international
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions
of international law be enforced. *%
C. AVAILABILITY OF TRIBUNALS TO TRY INDIVIDUALS
The sanction of individual criminal responsibility implies a tribunal or
tribunals where those accused of war crimes may be tried. At least this is
implied if we eschew the custom of punishment without a trial as practiced in
13the not too distant past. •*
Individuals have been subjected to the jurisdiction of both international
and municipal war crimes tribunals. Since there is no permanent interna-
tional criminal court with jurisdiction over war crimes, the international
tribunals necessarily have been &d_ hoc bodies and not necessarily composed
exclusively of nationals of victorious belligerents. •* Municipal tribunals
have tried not only enemy and neutral nationals, but nationals of the prosecut-
ing state who violated municipal regulations which restate principles of the
16
international law of war.
The tribunal which may try an individual for an alleged breach of the
17laws of war is greatly affected by the theory on which jurisdiction is based.
The tribunal which should try an individual depends to a great extent on the
location best suited for an impartial hearing. The highly emotional nature

of such trials make impartial hearings difficult at best and almost impossible
in some locations, such as in the state of the victims of recent atrocities.
II. HISTORY OF PENAL JURISDICTION OVER WAR CRIMES
The history of any human activity is a record of the interaction of ab-
stract thought and experience in solving problems. The history of penal juris-
diction over war crimes is no exception. The problem of unnecessary destruc-
tion of values caused the formulation of theories of individual responsibility
and punishment. These theories were tested, in whole or in part, in an at-
tempt to deter the undesirable acts. The successes and failures of the theories
in practice were noted, and new or altered theories were formulated and the
cycle continues.
There are five basic principles on which states acting individually and
groups of states acting jointly have invoked in making claims to penal juris-
diction. One or more of these theories of jurisdiction historically have been
used as the basis of claimed rights to try individuals for allegedly breaking
society's rules, whether the rules have been catagorized municipally or inter-
nationally. Those principles arei
F irst, the territorial principle determining jurisdiction by
reference to the place where the offence is committed} second,
the nationality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference
to the nationality or national character of the person committing
the offence} third, the protective principle, determining jurisdiction
by reference to the national interest injured by the offence}
fourthly, the universality principle, determining jurisdiction by
reference to the custody of the person committing the offence} and
fifth, the passive personality principle, determining jurisdiction
by reference to the nationality or national character of the per-
son injured by the offence.^-"
A. EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
Customary International law has long recognized the right of a belligerent
to punish members of enemy armed forces who have violated the laws and customs
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of war. It is difficult, however, to separate the juridical function of
sanctions against those individuals who went "beyond the "bounds of the law
and custom of war from the exercise of revenge against the nearest available
members of enemy forces. Certainly, the doctrine of reprisals has been mingled
with the concept of sanctions against war crimes,
!• Classical Writers
Long before the modern era, writers concerned with the laws and customs
of war approved the principle of punishment of individual members of enemy
forces who violated such customs. Grotius, mingling the concepts of reprisal
and sanctions against the violation of the laws of war, concluded that an
individual who did an injury not allowed by the customs of war was liable in
his person to reprisals.
Some writers, such as Wolff, have discussed the rights of the prisoner
of war in relation to his captors
i
... it is not allowable to kill those captured in war, not even
immediately, much less at some other time, unless some special
offense shall have been committed because of which they are
liable to punishment. *
and Vattell
There is, however, one case where life may be denied an enemy who
surrenders.... This is when the enemy has been guilty of some
enormous breach of the law of nations and particularly if it be
at the same time a violation of the laws of war. This denial of
quarter is no natural consequence of the war, but the punishment
of his crime; a punishment which the injured party has a right
to inflict « but for the penalty to be just it must fall on the
guilty.22
Others discuss the disposition of enemy subjects after the hostilities
have ended. Suarez takes the view that the guilty can be punished, but he
seems to counsel leniencyi
... after the war has been entirely ended, certain guilty individuals
among the enemy may also, with justice, be put to death... 2 -'

8also i
••• in such a judgment, the offender cannot be visited with
every sort of punishment nor deprived of all his property without
any restrictions, but may be punished only in proportion to
his fault.m
Gentili saw the victor as a judge to pass on the punishment to be inflicted
on the defeated enemy, collectively and individually. He also stressed the
25
values of justice and moderation. Victoria stated a view smacking of the
universality principle
i
... be it observed that princes have authority not only over their
own subjects, but also over foreigners so far as to prevent them
from committing wrongs, and this is by the law of nations and by
the authority of the whole world. 2o
He continues!
Even when victory has been won and no danger remains, it is lawful
to kill the guilty . . . this is permissible against our own wrong-
doing citizens. Therefore also against foreigners; for ... a
prince when at war has by right of war the same authority over the
enemy as if he were their lawful judge and prince,^7
However
i
... it is not right to kill all the guilty among the enemy. We
ought, then, to take into account the nature of the wrong done
by the enemy and of the damage they have caused and of their
other offences, and from that standpoint to move to our revenge
and punishment, without any cruelty and inhumanity. 2"
All of the classical writers espoused the common theme that to the vic-
tor belongs not only the spoils but also the competence to pass judgment on
enemy individuals. The asserted right to punish members of their own mili-
tary forces could be based on the nationality principle. The right over the
enemy, however, if we are to discount revenge, must have been based on one or
more of the other principles of jurisdiction. It appears likely that some
rudimentary idea of universality was one such basis,
2. Earlv International Conferences Dealinrc With the Laws of War
Beginning about the middle of the nineteenth century, there were a series

of international conferences dealing with various aspects of the laws and
customs of war. All dealt with the problems of bringing into existence a
code of rules which would be recognized as binding on belligerents and neutrals
in the retreat position of force as a means of settling international disagree-
ments. The various declarations and conventions resulting from the conferences
are full of language deploring the needless suffering of individuals and the
wanton destruction of property. Many specific rules are set forth regulating
the conduct of belligerents and neutrals and prohibiting certain activities so
far as permitted by military necessity.
30
These conferences resulted in the Declaration of Paris in I856} the
Declaration of St. Petersburg"5 in 1868 j the Geneva Convention of 1864} 3 a
33draft convention prepared by the Geneva Conference of 1868 which never
3'+
became effective} the Geneva Convention of 1906j^ the various Conventions,
Declarations, Resolutions and Wishes prepared by the Hague Peace Conferences
in 1899 and 1907}^ and the Declaration of London in 1909. None of these
international agreements contained any specific sanctions against individuals.
The method of dealing with individual violators was occasionally men-
tioned. In article twenty-eight of the Geneva Convention of 1906 is found
the following language
t
The Signatory Governments also undertake to adopt, or to propose
to their legislative bodies, should their military law be insuf-
ficient for the purpose, the measures necessary for the repression
in time of war of individual acts of pillage and maltreatment of
the wounded and sick of armies, as well as for the punishment, as
an unlawful employment of military insignia, of the improper use
of the Red Cross flag and armlet (brassard) by officers and soldiers
or private individuals not protected by the present Conventions. 37
In article forty-one of the Conventions With Regard to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land of both 1899 and 1907, it is stated, concerning viola-
tions of the terms of armistice
j
A violation of the terms of the armistice by individuals acting
on their own initiative, only confers the right of demanding the




Article twenty-one of the 1907 Convention for the Adaption of the Principles
of the Geneva Convention to Maritime War is similar to article twenty-eight of
the Geneva Convention of 1906 . Finally,, article sixty-six of the Declara-
tion of London of 1909 states?
The Signatory Powers undertake to insure in any war in which all
the belligerents are parties to the present Declaration the mutual
observance of the rules contained herein. They will therefore
issue the necessary instructions to their authorities and to their
armed forces * and will take such measures as may be required in
order to insure that it will be applied by their courts, and more
particularly by their prize courts.^0
It can be seen that, although the above provisions do not specifically
state so, the generally accepted idea was that each state should punish its
own nationals who violated the laws of war, as stated by the Conventions and
Declarations, in its own tribunals. It was thought that the solemn promises
of nations would be enough to insure the observance of international obliga-
tions and, if not, public opinion would force compliance.
3» Aftermath of World War I
At the cessation of hostilities in World War I, the victorious Allied
Powers met at Versailles for the purpose of drafting a peace treaty. At the
plenary session of the Preliminary Peace Conference on January 25» 1919t it
was decided to create a commission to inquire into and report upon the respon-
sibility of the authors of war, the facts regarding breaches of the laws and
customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their Allies,
the degree of responsibility for these offenses attaching to particular mem-
bers of the enemy forces, and the constitution and procedure of a tribunal
h2
appropriate for the trial of such offenses.
The Commission reported back to the Preliminary Conference on March 19,
1919. Recommendations concerning a tribunal were sub-divided into two sections.
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Regarding the acts which provoked the war and accompanied its inception, the
Commission did not consider these as strictly war crimes and did not recommend
individual prosecution and punishment. It did recommend that in the future,
43
penal sanctions should be provided for such outrages.
With regard to violations of the laws and customs of war,, the Commissions
relying on customary international law, stated that every belligerent had the
power and authority to try individuals alleged to be guilty of war crimes if
they had physical custody of the ' individuals . It stated further that each
belligerent had the power to set up appropriate tribunals for the trial of
such cases. The Commission recommended that a high tribunal be established
for the trial of individuals accused of war crimes committed over wide geo-
graphical areas or against the nationals of several Allied nations.
The high tribunal recommended by the Commission was to be composed of
three persons appointed by each of the major Allied and Associated Powers.
The tribunal was to have the power to determine its own procedure, to sit in
divisions of not less than five members, to appoint experts to assist in the
trial of cases, and to request national courts to assume jurisdiction for the
purpose of determining facts or for trial and judgment. Provision was made for
a Prosecuting Commission of five members to be appointed by the major Powers.
National courts were prohibited from proceeding with the trial of an individ-
ual selected by the Prosecuting Commission for trial before the high tribunal.
It was finally specified that the law to be applied by the high tribunal was
to be "the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the
46dictates of public conscience."
The final draft of the Versailles Treaty, ^ in article 227, provided
for the public arraignment of the former German emperor for offenses against
International morality and the sanctity of treaties. He was to be tried by a
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special tribunal composed of one judge from each of the principle Allied and
Associated Powers • The former emperor, William II of Hohenzollern, fled to
^8
the Netherlands and was never tried.
Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty provided for the trial of other war
criminals as follows*
Article 228 - The German Government recognizes the right of the
Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals
persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws
and customs of war. Such person shall, if found guilty, be
sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will
apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a
tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her allies.
The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated
Powers, or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons
accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and
customs of war, who are specified either by name or by the rank,
office, or employment which they held under the German authorities.
Article 229 ~ Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals
of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before
the military tribunals of the Power. Persons guilty of criminal
acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and
Associated Powers will be brought before military Tribunals com-
posed of the members of the military tribunals of the Powers
concerned....
A long list of accused persons was prepared in accordance with article
228 and presented to the German Government by the principal Allied Governments.
The German Government objected to surrendering the accused persons, repre-
senting that the Government's very existence might be imperiled by the politi-
cal repercussions. It was proposed by the Germans that a reduced number of
4-9
persons be tried before the Supreme Court of the Empire in Leipzig.
The Allied Governments decided that the proposal was compatible with
article 228 of the Treaty and declined to take any part in the trials. They
did reserve the right to consider the results of the prosecutions, and if the
procedure proposed by Germany did not result in just punishment for the guilty,
50
to bring the accused before Allied tribunals. Eventually an abridged list
of forty-five names was submitted to the German Government for trial. The
Germans complained that they could not find certain of the individuals and
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that evidence was lacking against others * Twelve trials were finally held at
51
Leipzig resulting in six convictions with light sentences. The peace
treaties with Germany's allies were concluded after the Versailles pact and
were modeled on it, particularly with regard to war crimes. Apparently no
trials were conducted pursuant to these treaties.
**•• The Geneva Conventions , of ,192,9.
At a conference in Geneva in 1929 o attended by representatives of most of
the nations of the world, two Conventions concerning the laws of war were
approved. Both were signed on July 2?, 1929» and entered into force June 19»
1931.
52
The Prisoners of War Convention contained no mention of sanctions
against individual violators. The Convention Concerning the Amelioration of
the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field (Red Cross Con-
vention), on the other hand, contained provisions similar to those in earlier
Conventions and Declarations looking to states to punish their own nationals.
Article twenty-eight required the Governments of the High Contracting Parties
to recommend necessary measures to their legislatures, if not already suffici-
ent, to prevent private persons and unauthorized societies from using the em-
blem or name of the "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross" and to protect certain
designations of the Swiss Confederation. Article twenty-nine was more general
and required the Governments of the High Contracting Parties whose penal laws
were not already adequate to recommend to their legislatures the necessary
measures to repress, in time of war, acts in contravention of the provisions
of the Convention. Finally, article thirty provided for an investigation
upon the request of a belligerent alleging a violation of the Convention. If
a violation was proved, it was to be ended and repressed by the belligerents
as soon as possible. No specific methods of repression were mentioned.
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B. EXPERIENCE DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR II
There were many official pronouncements by Allied statesmen during World
War II indicating that there would be individual punishment of Axis war crimi-
nals if the Allied Powers prevailed. Even before the United States entered
the war, President Roosevelt joined Prime Minister Churchill in a warning to
the Axis Powers that there would be punishment for war crimes.
Atrocities committed behind the German lines in Russia were particularly
frequent and brutal. On November 7, 19^1» M„ Molotov sent a note to all nations
having diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, noting the atrocities and
stating that they violated the most elementary rules of international law
and human morality. After receiving additional information concerning German
actions, Molotov, on January 6, 19^2, circulated a further note declaring that
the Soviet Government held the Hitlerite Government responsible for the crimes
committed by German troops. -^ Early in 19^-2 nine European Powers-^ issued the
Declaration of St. James Palace in which, after describing the actions of
German nationals constituting war crimes, they pledged toi
. . . place among their principal war aims the punishment, through
the channels of organized justice, of those guilty or responsible
for those crimes, whether they have ordered them, perpetrated
them, or participated in them . . .-57
In July, 19^2, the atrocities of the German army continuing in occupied
territories, the nine powers who signed the Declaration of St. James Palace
made a collective approach to the Governments of the United States, Great
Britain, Soviet Russia, and the Holy See asking that those powers "solemnly
warn those guilty of such acts". The Governments of the United States, Great
Britain, and Soviet Russia replied, promising the trial of those accused of
war crimes.
In a Declaration issued in Moscow on November 1, 19^3, Roosevelt, Churchill,
and Stalin stated that at the time of any armistice the German officers, men,
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and members of the Nazi Party responsible fox* enumerated war crimes or those
taking a consenting part in them would be tried and punished according to the
laws of the liberated countries where the crimes took place. They stated
further that if the crimes had no particular geographical location, the respon-
sible participating individuals would be "punished by a joint decision of the
Governments of the Allies •"•> A statement of intention to mete out punishment
for individual violations of the laws of war was also Included in official
59pronouncements made at the Potsdam Conference.
1» International Military..Tribunal at Nuremberg
In 1945 the major Allied Powers convened an International Conference on
Military Trials in London. The delegates from the United States, Great Britain,
France, and Soviet Russia who met at London represented a great divergence in
legal concepts and traditions. Great Britain and the United States adhered
to the common law approach} and France and Soviet Russia , to the civil law or
continental approach. There were also significant differences between the
French and Soviet concepts of law due to differences in origin, tradition,
and philosophy.
All delegates agreed that the major figures of the German Government
should be brought before an international tribunal, but there was a fundamental
difference between the way the Soviet delegates viewed the functions of the
proposed tribunal and the way the delegates from the other three powers viewed
them. While the United States, France, and Great Britain contemplated as im-
partial and independent a tribunal as possible under the circumstances, the
Soviet delegates viewed the proposed tribunal as just one of the organs of
the Governments of the victorious Powers to be used to carry out previously
agreed upon political policy. As stated by a Soviet delegate, General
Nikitchenko, during the session of the Conference on June 29, 19^-5'
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We are dealing here with the chief war criminals who have already
been convicted and whose conviction has been already announced by
both the Moscow and Crimea declarations by the heads of the govern-
ments, and those declarations both declare to carry out immediately
just punishment for the offenses vrhich have been committed. °*
Later the same day he stated
t
.•« the Soviet Delegation points out that, at the time when the
declaration was made by the leaders of the United Nations on the
question that the chief criminals should be tried, it was not
certain whether these criminals would actually be tried by a court
or would be punished by some purely political action. That is to
say, they might have been dealt with by means other than a trial.
Since then it has been decided that they shall go through a process
of trial, but the object of that trial is, of course, the punish-
ment of the criminals, and therefore the role of the prosecutor
should be merely a role of assisting the court in the actual cases . .
.
and there would be no question that the judge has the character
of an impartial person."2
Much of the time of the Conference was spent in discussing the United
States' proposal for allowing the proposed tribunal the jurisdiction to try
certain Nazi organizations on charges of criminality as a means of reaching
thousands of Individual members at later trials » The Soviet delegates opposed
the plan, General Nikitchenko, stating during the June 29 sessioni
The Soviet Delegation explains this point by the fact that organi-
zations such as the S.S. or the Gestapo have already been declared
criminal by authorities higher than the Tribunal itself, both in
the Moscow and Crimea declarations, and the fact of their criminality
has definitely been established. We cannot imagine any position
arising in which the Tribunal might possibly bring out a verdict
that any one of these organizations was not criminal when it has
most definitely been labeled so by the governments. °3
One of the most serious disagreements between the United States and Soviet
Russia was on the definition of the crimes over which the proposed tribunal
was to have jurisdiction* The Soviet delegation proposed a definition which
had the effect of declaring certain acts crimes only when committed by Nazis.
The United States contended that the criminal character of the acts did not
depend on who committed them. At the final meeting of the Conference, the
Soviet delegation accepted in principle the United States' view of International
crimes, and the United States agreed that the proposed tribunal would have
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jurisdiction only over individuals who committed such crimes on behalf of
the Axis Powers.
The London Conference produced the London Agreement of 8 August 19^5
•
This Agreement, after citing the Moscow Declaration and stating that the
major powers were acting in the interests of all the United Nations, declared!
Article 1. There shall be established after consutation with the
Control Council for Germany an International Military Tribunal for
the trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular geo-
graphical location whether they be accused individually or in their
capacity as members of organizations or groups or in both capacities.
Article 2. The constitutions jurisdiction, and functions of the
International Military Tribunal shall be those set out in the
Charter annexed to this Agreement, which Charter shall form an
integral part of this Agreement.
The Agreement went on to require the Signatories to assist in the investi*
gation and trial of persons before the International Military Tribunal. It
specifically stated that nothing in the Agreement would prejudice the pro-
visions of the Moscow Declaration pertaining to the return of war criminals to
the countries where they committed their crimes nor would prejudice the juris-
diction or powers of national or occupation courts established for the trial
of war criminals. Other provisions allowed adherence to the Agreement by any
Government of the United Nations,
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal was a separate docu-
ment attached to the London Agreement. It provided for the establishment of
a tribunal composed of four members, with an alternate for each. One member
and one alternate were to be appointed by each of the Signatories. Regarding
jurisdiction the Charter provided in Chapter Hi
Article 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to
in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to
try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European
Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations,
committed any of the following crimes
t
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE ...
(b) WAR GRIMES ...
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(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY ...
Leaders g organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy
to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all
acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.
Chapter. II also specifically ruled out consideration of official position,
including Heads of State, and provided that a defendant would not be free from
responsibility because he acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of
a superior. Such orders could be considered, however, in mitigation of punish-
ment. Of particular interest, in view of the negotiations at the London Con-
ference, were provisions contained in articles nine and tern
At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization
the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the
individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which
the individual was a member was a criminal organization . .
.
In cases where a group or organisation is declared criminal by the
Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall
have the right to bring individuals to trial for membership therein
before national, military, or occupation courts. In any such case
the criminal nature of the group or organization is considered
proved and shall not be questioned.
The remainder of the Charter provided for procedures for prosecution and de-
fense, the powers of the Tribunal, the manner of presenting evidence, and the
allocation of expenses. Chapter III provided that the decision of the Tri-
bunal as to guilt or innocence was final and not subject to review. Regarding
sentences, the Tribunal could impose death or any lesser punishment and, in
addition, could deprive any convicted person of stolen property and order its
delivery to the Control Council for Germany, which was composed of the four
major Allied Powers. The sentences imposed by the Tribunal were to be carried
out by the Control Council, which could reduce or otherwise alter the sen-
tence but could not increase its severity.
Nineteen nations, -' other than the four major Allied Powers, subscribed
to the principles of the Charter, and a common indictment for all twenty-three
nations was presented at Nuremberg. The indictment named twenty-four individ-
uals and seven organizations as defendants. Only twenty-one individuals

19
together with the organizations were actually tried, in hearings beginning
in November, 19^5. The judgment of the Tribunal was delivered on Septem-
ber 30 and October 1, 19^6 > Of the twenty-one individuals, six were convicted
on all four counts of the indictment and three were acquitted on all charges.
Others were acquitted on one or more counts but convicted on at least one
count. Twelve of the convicted defendants were sentenced to death; and the
others, to various periods of confinement. Of the seven accused organizations,
four were declared criminal with limitations, and three were not declared
68
criminal. The Soviet member of the Tribunal dissented from the judgment,
declaring that the three individuals acquitted should have been convicted and
that all seven organizations should have been declared criminal. He also dis-
agreed with the life sentence assessed against one defendant, stating that the
death penalty should have been imposed.
Those persons sentenced to death ~ with the exceptions of Bormann who
was never found and Goering who committed suicide in his cell — were executed
in Nuremberg on October 16, 19^6, pursuant to the orders of the Control Council.
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The defendants sentenced to confinement were incarcerated in a jail at Spandau.
On December 11, 1S&6, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a
resolution taking note of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and af-
firming the principles of international law recognized by the Charter and Judg-
ment of the Nuremberg Tribunal
.
(The judgment of the Tribunal for the Far East
was not delivered until November, 19kQ t ) By the Resolution, the General Assem-
bly also recognized its obligation under the United Nations Charter to initiate
studies and make recommendations for encouraging the progressive development
of international law and its codification and directed the Committee on the
Codification of International Law to "treat as a matter of primary importance"





2 . International Military Tribunal for the Far East
The basic policy for the prosecution and punishment of major Japanese war
71
criminals was the "Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender" issued
by the United States, the Republic of China, and Great Britain at Potsdam on
July 26, 19^5, and later adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The Proclamation called upon Japan to surrender unconditionally and stated in
article ten
J
Vfe do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or
destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all
war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our
prisoners ...
72
Under the authorization conferred by an Imperial Proclamation, Japanese
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representatives signed the Instrument of Surrender in Tokyo Bay on Septem-
ber 2, 19^-5 • By the Instrument of Surrender the Japanese representatives, on
behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government, and the Japanese
Imperial General Headquarters, accepted the provisions set forth in the
Proclamation issued on July 26, 19'-±5» at Potsdam and stated
i
We hereby command all civil, military, and naval officials to obey
and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate
this surrender and issued by him or under his authority....
tfe hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and
their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam
Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take
whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied
Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established by
Special Proclamation of the Allied Supreme Commander in the Pacific dated
74
January 19» 19^6» After alluding to the July 26 Proclamation at Potsdam
and the Instrument of Surrender signed by Japan and reciting his authority
as Allied Supreme Commander, General KacArthur, in his Proclamation providedt
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Article 1. There shall he established an International Military
Tribunal for the Far East for the trial of those persons charged
individually, or as members of organizations, or in both capaci-
ties, with offenses which include crimes against peace.
Article 2. The Constitution, jurisdiction and functions of this
Tribunal are those set forth in the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, approved by me this day.
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, -5
as amended slightly on April 26, 1946, provided for a Tribunal composed of
not less than six nor more than eleven members appointed by the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers from names submitted by Signatories to the Instru-
raent of Surrender plus India and the Philippines. The officers of the Tribunal
and the general procedure to be followed were provided for in Section I, trial
safeguards for the accused in Section III, powers of the Tribunal and trial
procedure in Section IV, and provisions for findings and sentencing in Sec-
tion V. Section II set forth the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and other gener-
al provisions. It stated in article fivei
The Tribunal shall have the power to try and punish Far Eastern
war criminals who as individuals or as members of organizations
are charged with offenses which include Crimes against Peace.
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility
s
a. Crimes against Peace . .
.
b. Conventional Star Crimes ...
c. Crimes against Humanity ...
Nine members of the Tribunal were appointed, pursuant to the Charter,
on February 15, 1946, and two additional members from India and the Philippines
were appointed later. Each of the Governments of the States whose nationals
were members of the Tribunal appointed prosecuting counsel, and an indictment
signed by those counsel was served on twenty-eight defendants and filed with
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the Tribunal on April 29, 1946. The Tribunal convened formally for the
first time on May 3» 1946, and pronounced judgment on November 4-12, 1948.
Of the twenty-eight defendants, two died during the trials, and one was unable

22
to plead because of insanity. All of the remaining twenty~five defendants
were found guilty of one or more counts of the indictment. Seven were sen-
tenced to deathf sixteen, to life imprisonment} one, to twenty years impri-
7?
sonment; and one, to seven years imprisonment.
3« Municipal Tribunals
Even before the end of World War II, several nations undertook to try
individuals in municipal tribunals for alleged violations of the laws of war.
The Germans initiated proceedings against some Allied prisoners of war, and
both the United States and the Soviet Union conducted war crimes trials while
hostilities were still in progress. After the war had ended, the Allied
Powers conducted many war crimes trials in municipal tribunals. Some were
permanent courts and others, ad,Ji2Cj some were civilian courts and others,
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military.
Various theories of jurisdiction were invoked as authority for these
trials and for war crimes legislation enacted by the Governments of the Allied
Powers, The continental European war crimes courts were usually based on
municipal penal statutes and were required to limit jurisdiction to that pro-
vided by the statute. The statutes generally relied on the territoriality,
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passive personality, and protection of interests theories of jurisdiction.
The United States, 3ritish, and Commonwealth tribunals were not bound by
municipal penal statutes and exercised even wider jurisdiction than the courts
of the continental countries, tending toward the theory of universality. These
tribunals frequently did not limit jurisdiction due to the geographic location
of the prohibited act, the time the act was committed, the nationality of
the victim, or the nationality of the accused. In addition, the Allied Powers
tried and punished by courts-martial members of their own armed forces accused





A distinct "hybrid" type of tribunal was permitted by Allied Control
Council Law No. 10 promulgated by the four major Allied Powers in Berlin on
December 20, 19^5. The Law referred to and incorporated the Moscow Declara-
tion of October 30, 194-3 i and the London Agreement of 8 August 19^5 and set
out the same general acts as crimes as the Charter of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal at Nuremberg. The Law detailed the relationship of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to the Tribunals allowed under the
Law and stated in Article IIIi
1, Each occupying authority, within its Zone of occupation,...
d) shall have the right to cause all persons so arrested and charged
and not delivered to another authority, as herein provided, or
released, to be brought to trial before an appropriate tribunal.
Such tribunal may, in the case of crimes committed by persons of
German citizenship or nationality against other persons of German
citizenship or nationality or stateless person, be a German court,
if authorized by the occupying authorities.
2. The tribunal by which persons charged with offenses hereunder
shall be tried and the rules and procedure thereof shall be deter-
mined or designated by each Zone Commander for his respective Zone.
Nothing herein is intended to, or shall impair or limit the juris-
diction or power of any court or tribunal now or hereafter estab-
lished in any Zone by the Commander thereof, or of the International
Military Tribunal established by the London Agreement of 8 August
19^5.
Based on the above Law, the Commander of the United States' zone of occu-
83
pation in Germany issued Ordinance No. ? J on October 18, 194-6, which, as
slightly amended on February 17, 194-7, established United States Military
Tribunals to try additional German war criminals. The jurisdiction of the
tribunals was set out in Article It
The purpose of this Ordinance is to provide for the establishment
of military tribunals which shall have power to try and punish
persons charged with offenses recognized as crimes in Article II
of Control Council Law No. 10, including conspiracies to commit
such crimes. Nothing herein shall prejudice the jurisdiction or
the powers of other courts established for the trial of any such
offenses.
Provision was made for the procedure to be followed, for the powers of the
tribunals in sentencing, and for other matters. It was stated specifically

24
that the findings of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg were
84
to be final in certain types of cases.
Twelve trials were held at Nuremberg by the United States Military Tri-
bunals, beginning on October 26, 1946, and ending on April 14, 1949. Of one
hundred eighty-five individuals indicted, one hundred seventy°seven were tried,
resulting in one hundred forty-two convictions and thirty-five acquittals. Of
those convicted, twenty-four received death sentences; twenty, sentences to
confinement for life; and the remainder, sentences to lesser periods of con-
finement.
The French also used Law No. 10 as authority for French Tribunals in their
sector of Germany. The British set up a German Tribunal and the Soviet Union
85did not use the Law at all.
The distinctive feature of the United States Tribunals was that they were
established under international authority and used international law but were
staffed by United States' judges and used United States* procedure. In this
respect, they differed from both international tribunals and purely municipal
tribunals
.
The treaties of peace with other Axis Powers were concluded by the Allied
Powers on February 10, 1947. Only the treaty with Italy contained war crimes
provisions. Article forty-five required Italy to apprehend and surrender for
trial to any requesting United Nations Government persons accused of war
crimes and any available witnesses to the crimes.
a. Israeli Trial of Eichmann
Throughout the Allied war crimes trials the name of Adolph Eichmann kept
cropping up in connection with the systematic Nazi murders in Germany and
Austria of large numbers of individuals. Many of the individuals wei^e classi-
fied by the Nazis as "Jews", "Poles", "Gypsies", "Slavs", and "Ukranians".
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Other individuals were murdered without being specifically designated as be-
longing to an undesirable group. Prior to the 19^5 collapse of Germany
Eichmann fled to Argentina, entering that country under a false identity and
apparently illegally. Through his wife, who eventually joined him in Argen-
tina, Eichmann was tracked down and captured by a group of Israelis in Buenos
Aires on fey 10, I960. After a few weeks of captivity in a private home in
Buenos Aires, he was flown to Israel.
Upon his arrival in Israel,- Eichmann was charged under an Israeli stat-
ute, the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710 (1950), on fif-
teen counts. ' The offenses charged were grouped into four primary categories:
crimes against the Jewish people j crimes against humanity} war crimes} and
membership in hostile organizations, Eichmann was convicted by the Israeli
trial court and sentenced to death. He was executed on Kay 31 » 19&2, after
his appeal to the Supreme Court of Israel and his plea for clemency to the
President of Israel were both denied.
Argentina complained to the Security Council of the United Nations soon
after the abduction and before the trial. Argentina denounced the abduction
as a violation of its territorial sovereignty but did not ask for the return
of Eichmann. Israel and Argentina issued a .joint communique on August 3»1960,
by which the two Governments resolved to regard the incident as closed but
recognized that the Israeli actions had infringed upon the fundamental rights
of the State of Argentina.
There is no doubt that the actions of the Nazis in their attempt to
liquidate those they considered undesirable constitutes one of the darkest
chapters in human history. The evidence is also very strong that Adolph
Eichmann took an active and willing part in these actions. Yet, the trial of
Eichmann has given rise to serious doubts about the jurisdiction of the
Israeli court. Eichmann was tried under a statute not in effect at the time
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the acts in question were committed . The statute was enacted by the legis-
lative "body of a nation not in existence at the time the acts were committed.
Eichmann was not and had never been a national of Israel » Since Israel was
not a state at the time of the acts, the victims could not have been nationals
of Israel at that time, although some of the survivors later became nationals
of the new state. None of the alleged acts took place within the territory
which later became the State of Israel. The Israeli courts did not base their
jurisdiction on the territoriality or nationality theories of jurisdiction, nor
did they mention the passive personality principle. What the trial court did
mention were the theories of universality and protection of interests.
The universality theory had been used extensively in the trials immediately
following World War II and would seem to be a legitimate basis for the Israeli
courts on all categories of charges except crimes against the Jewish people.
In fact, the rationale of that category of charges is difficult to understand
at all. The trial court stated in regard to those charges i "It is superflu-
ous to add that the 'crime against the Jewish people', which constitutes the
crime of 'genocide', is nothing but the gravest type of 'crime against human-
ity' .... Therefore, all that has been said in the Nuremberg principles about
•crimes against humanity' applies a fortiori to 'crime against the Jewish
people' ...." This explanation is either the result of erroneous legal
89
analysis or the cover for ulterior political motives. In the legal sphere,
the basis of the universality theory is that the act is a crime against all
of humanity, not just one religious group.
The claim of jurisdiction based on the protection of interests principle
is much more tenuous. The trial court, in essence, held that it had juris-
diction because some of the victims of Eichmann were adherents of the Jewish
religion and that any harm to such adherents, wherever located, was a threat
to the State of Israel. This was the holding even though the acts in ques-
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tion took place before there was a State of Israel.
Other questions have been raised about the jurisdiction of the Israeli
courts because of the abduction of Eichmann from Argentina and certain pro-
visions of the Genocide Convention^ which was in effect and to which Israel
was a party. Regarding the abduction question, the trial court properly held
that the abduction vras an international wrong against the State of Argentina
9ibut did not affect its competence to try the individual. It has been pre-
viously noted that Israel and Argentina had reached agreement on the inter-
national question before the trial began and that Argentina had not asked that
Eichmann be returned.
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The Genocide Convention, in Article IV, provides that persons charged
with genocide will be tried by a competent tribunal in the state where the
act was committed unless there is an international tribunal with jurisdiction.
At least some of the crimes with which Eichmann was charged constituted crimes
of genocide under the Convention. The trial court excluded the Convention on
the ground that it only applied to crimes of genocide committed in the future,
93
and therefore was not applicable to the acts committed by Eichmann. A close
reading of the Convention does not compel such a conclusion. A better argu-
ment would seem to be that the Convention provision is not exclusive and that
crimes of this type and magnitude should not require a territorial link to
provide jurisdiction. An analogy could be drawn to the universality of juris-
94diction provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Those Conventions also
define as grave breaches, subjecting violators to universal jurisdiction,
several acts which could be construed as crimes of genocide.
The Israeli court seems to have been on firm jurisdictional ground in
trying Eichmann on all charges except those dealing with the "Jewish people"
concept. None of the traditional theories of jurisdiction are authority for
his trial on such charges. Indeed, the acts alleged could have been charged
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as crimes against humanity and the universality principle of jurisdiction
95
properly cited for authority.
b. Continuing Preoccupation of the Soviet Union with War Crimes Trials
By the end of the 1950' s most of the nations of the world were trying to
forget the atrocities of World War II, The municipal war crimes trials had
ended, with the exception of the Eichmann trial, everywhere except in the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Government was continuing to investigate alleged
collaborators and war criminals and to "bring them to trial. Both the investi-
gations and the trials, which continued until at least 1970, received extensive
press coverage in the official Soviet newspapers.
Most of the Soviet war crimes' activity involved Soviet citizens who
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allegedly collaborated with the Germany army in committing war crimes. At
least one celebrated case, however, dealt with a woman who was accused of
collaboration alone and probably was not a war crimes trial in the international
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sense. The trials that were reported were sometimes before civilian tribunals
and sometimes, before military tribunals, but the sentences were uniformly
stiff. It was stressed in some reports that the acts involved had been com-
mitted within the territorial limits of the Soviet Union, but statements from
official sources which were reported in the press indicated the acceptance of
98theories of jurisdiction other than territoriality. In conjunction with
reporting the investigations and trials, the Soviet press kept up a constant
stream of criticism of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States,
and other western Governments for not extraditing alleged war criminals for
99trial in Soviet courts. The criticism grew particularly virulent when the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany announced in 1965 that it con-
sidered that the statute of limitations would run on World War II war crimes
effective Kay 8, 1965. In this connection, there was extensive press
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coverage of the Soviet ratification of the Convention on the Non-Applicability
101
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.
k. The Genocide Convention of 1948
The General Assembly of the United Nations began discussions of the prob-
lem of genocide on November 9s 19^6 , at the request of the delegations from
10?
Cuba, India, and Panama. A draft resolution accompanied the request. Other
states submitted drafts, and various committees of the United Nations discussed
the drafts and prepared additional proposals. The universality theory of
jurisdiction was defeated in committee by the major powers, including the
United States and the Soviet Union. The delegates stated that the political
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nature of genocide would not lend itself to such broad jurisdiction. The
Soviet delegates took an active part in all committee discussions and, while
supporting the need for a genocide convention, consistently opposed any type
104
of international court with jurisdiction to punish offenders.
A draft convention was finally prepared, and the text was unanimously
adopted by the General Assembly, without abstentions, on December 9» 19^8. A
number of states signed almost immediately, and the convention went into effect
on January 12, 1951 • It has never been ratified by the United States.
The Convention, after declaring genocide a crime under international law,
defined genocide broadly and specifically stated that the acts described con-
stituted genocide whether committed in time of peace or war# Also punish-
able were conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to cora-
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mit genocide, attempting to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.
Provisions for sanctions against violations of the Convention were contained
in articles four through nine, as follows
t
Article IV. Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are con-





Article V. The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance
with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to
give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particu-
lar „ to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide
or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.
Article VI. Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of
the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with re-
spect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its
jurisdiction.
Article VII. Genocide and other acts enumerated in article III shall
not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant
extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.
Article VIII. Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent
organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter
of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention
and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the acts enumerated
in article III.
Article IX. Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for geno-
cide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any
of the parties to the dispute.
The Soviet Union ratified the Convention on Kay 3, 195^, followed shortly
by other Communist Governments. The Soviet Union and other Communist Govern-
ments made two identical reservations to the Convention. One did not concern
sanctions, but regarding article nine, it was stated
i
The Soviet Union does not consider as binding upon itself the pro-
visions of article IX which provides that disputes between the
Contracting Parties with regard to the interpretation, application
and implementation of the present Convention shall be referred for
examination to the International Court at the request of any party
to the dispute, and declares that, as regards the International
Court's jurisdiction in respect of disputes concerning the interpre-
tation, application and implementation of the Convention, the Soviet
Union will, as hitherto, maintain the position that in each particu-
lar case the agreement of all parties to the dispute is essential




C. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 19^9
Both before and during World War II the necessity for revising and extend-
ing the various conventions regulating the conduct of warfare was apparent.
On February i5» 19^5» the International Committee of the Red Cross notified
governments and national Red Cross societies that it intended to undertake that
task. The Committee set about assembling as much data as possible. Much
information was contained in the extensive records of the Red Cross itself.
Other data came from the files of governments and national Red Cross societies
of former belligerent countries and from neutral countries, especially those
which had acted as Protecting Powers. Other information came from national
and international relief organizations and from individuals such as former pris-
oners of war, camp physicians, and spokesmen. All this information had to be
systematized and analyzed before it became useful.
The International Committee convened a Commission of Experts in Geneva in
October, 19^5* It had a limited scope and was comprised of the neutral members
of the "Mixed Medical Commission" instituted by the 1929 Prisoners of War Con-
vention. This Commission of Experts revised treaty clauses within its area
of expertise. The second Commission of Experts was formally entitled the
"Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross Societies for the Study of the
Conventions and of various Problems relative to the Red Cross", This meeting,
attended by one hundred forty-five delegates representing fifty countries, was
convened in Geneva by the International Committee and sat from July 26 to
August 3t 19^6 , studying various proposals. Several months later seventy
official representatives of fifteen countries met in Geneva to review the work
of the Red Cross. This meeting was called a "Conference of Government Experts
for the Study of the Conventions for the Protection of War Victims". While
sitting from April Ik to 26, 19^7, the Conference considered the preliminary
work of the Red Cross and drafts submitted by several governments. Before
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adjourning, the Conference adopted amendments to the existing Geneva Conven-
tions and established a preliminary Draft Convention for the Protection of
107
Civilians in Time of War. Opinions of governments which were unable to
send delegates to the April conference were solicited,and several sent repre-
sentatives to Geneva to discuss the work to date with the International Com-
mittee. Subsequently, the International Committee submitted all of the pro-
posals to a special Commission of Red Cross Societies which sat in Geneva on
September 15 and 16, 19^7 • This Commission approved of the drafts as a whole,
but appended several suggestions. After further consultations with interested
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groups, the International Committee completed the Draft Conventions and
issued them in May, 19^8, to all governments and national Red Cross Societies.
The Seventeenth International Red Cross Conference, attended by the
representatives of fifty governments and fifty-two national Red Cross societies,
met in Stockholm from August 20 to 30, 1S&8. Subject to a few amendments,
the Conference adopted the Draft Conventions submitted by the International
Committee. The Conference also invited all states to meet as soon as possible
109in diplomatic conference for the adoption and signature of the approved texts.
The Draft Conventions adopted by the Stockholm Conference were used as
the exclusive working documents for the "Diplomatic Conference for the Estab-
lishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of the War"
convened in Geneva by the Swiss Federal Council, as trustee of the Geneva Con-
ventions. The Diplomatic Conference, which met from April 21 to August 12,
194-9, was attended by the representatives of sixty-three governments. Fifty-
nine governments were represented by delegations with full voting powers, and
four by observers. Under the chairmanship of M. Max Petitpierre of Switzer-
land the Conference established four primary committees which sat simultaneously
and considered respectlvelyj (l) the First Geneva Convention and the Second
which adapted it to Maritime warfare, (2) the Prisoners of War Convention,
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(3) a Convention for the protection of civilians, and (k) provisions common to
all four Conventions. There were also many working parties and, near the end
of the Conference, committees for co-ordination and drafting met in an effort
to achieve maximum practical uniformity in the texts. At the close of the
Conference on August 12, 19^9 » the assembled delegates adopted and opened for
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signature the four Geneva Conventions of 19*+9.
!• Provisions Relating to Penal Jurisdiction
The particularly ruthless practices of certain belligerent powers during
World War II and the widespread violation of the laws of war, both customary
and conventional, focused the attention of the world on the necessity for more
effective sanctions against violators. The many war crimes trials conducted
in the immediate post-war period, while undoubtedly supported by the great
majority of the people of the world, raised questions in the minds of many
thoughtful, people about the propriety of such ad hoc procedures.
The International Committee of the Red Cross was of the opinion that any
future international conventions on the laws and customs of war must include
very strict provisions for the repression of violations. Pursuant to its
opinion, the International Committee broached the matter to the Conference of
Experts which met at Geneva in 19^ and 19^7. The assembled experts took no
action themselves but asked the International Committee to make a more thorough
study of the whole problem of sanctions. In 19^8 the International Committee
submitted the following draft article to the Stockholm Conference!
The legislation of the Contracting Parties shall prohibit all acts
contrary to the stipulations of the present Convention.
Each Contracting Party shall be under obligation to search for the
persons alleged to be guilty of breaches of the present Convention,
whatever their nationality, and in accordance with its own laws
or with the conventions prohibiting acts that may be considered as
war crimes, to indict such persons before its own tribunals, or
to hand them over for judgment to another Contracting Party. 111
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At the time of the submission the International Committee stated that it had
not had sufficient time to study the question completely and proposed further1
inquiry. The Stockholm Conference suggested that the International Committee
continue its study and submit proposals to a later Conference.
Four government experts were invited to Geneva to meet with the Inter-
national Committee to make a thorough study of the matter of penal sanctions.
The result was a draft of four new articles to be included in each of the
proposed Conventions. The partial text of the proposed articles was as follows
t
I. Legislative measures
The High Contracting Parties undertake to incorporate the present
Convention as part of their national law, to ensure the prosecution
of any act contrary to its provisions, and to enact provisions for
the repression, by criminal penalties or appropriate disciplinary
measures, of any breach of the Convention.
Within two years after the ratification of this Convention, the High
Contracting Parties undertake to communicate to the Swiss Federal
Council, for transmission to all signatory or adhering States, the
laws and other measures adopted in pursuance of this Article.
II. Grave violation
Without prejudice to the provisions of the foregoing Article, grave
breaches of the Convention shall be punished as crimes a.gainst the
law of nations by the tribunals of any of the High Contracting
Parties or by any international jurisdiction, the competence of which
has been recognized by them. Grave breaches shall include in particu-
lar those which cause death, great human suffering, or serious injury
to body or health, those which constitute a grave denial of personal
liberty or a derogation from the dignity due to the person, or in-
volve extensive destruction of property, also breaches which by reason
of their nature or persistence show a deliberate disregard of this
Convention.
Each High Contracting Party shall in conformity with the foregoing
Article enact suitable provisions for the extradition of any person
accused of a grave breach of this Convention, whom the said High
Contracting Party does not bring before its own tribunals.
III. Superior order ...
IV. Safeguards
The High Contracting Parties undertake not to subject any person
accused of a breach of this Convention, whatever his nationality,
to any tribunal of extraordinary jurisdiction....
At the Diplomatic Conference of 19^9 the question of penal sanctions was
referred to the Fourth Committee since it was proposed that the articles be
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the same for all four Conventions. There were some objections to considering
the draft proposals in that Committee due to the short period of time they
had been available for study. The Netherlands delegation adopted the draft
proposals as their own and submitted them to the Committee for its official
consideration. After much discussion, ten delegations submitted a joint text
113
which, with only slight modifications, was adopted by the Conference.
Each of the four Conventions contain a chapter entitled "Repression of
Abuses and Infractions" or a section entitled "Penal Sanctions". Some of the
provisions are identical and will be discussed together. Other provisions are









The first article of each Convention dealing with penal sanctions lays
the foundation for suppressing breaches of the Conventions. The text, omit-
ting portions dealing with trial procedure, is as follows
j
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons com-
mitting, or ordering to ba committed, any of the grave breaches
of the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered
to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may
also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of
its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another
High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting
Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the
suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present
Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following
article....
This common article obligates the ratifying states to do several things
t
enact necessary penal legislation; search for persons alleged to have com-
mitted grave breaches of the Conventions and bring such persons before its
own courts or hand them over for trial to another High Contracting Partyi and

36
take measures for the suppression of breaches of the Convention other than the
enumerated grave breaches. Although the Conventions, generally speaking,
become applicable upon the occurrence of one of the situations listed in com-
mon articles two and three, this article is intended to be put into effect in
peacetime.
The requirement of enacting penal legislation if current legislation is
inadequate is similar to the obligation required of the Parties to the 1929
Geneva Convention in article twenty-nine. As can be seen, the requirement of
reporting the actions taken to implement the Conventions which was contained
in earlier drafts, was omitted by the Diplomatic Conference in the final draft.
The legislation is required to provide sanctions against persons who order
grave breaches to be committed as well as persons who actually commit such
breaches. There is no reference to the responsibility of those who fail to
intervene, in order to prevent or suppress an infraction. Apparently courts
could fall back on the general principles of international law as applied in
the post-tforld War II war crimes trials.
The requirement to search for and prosecute offenders implies spontaneous
activity on the part of a state becoming aware that a person within its terri-
tory has committed a grave breach. The judicial proceedings are required to
be uniform in character, whatever the nationality of the accused.
The common article makes an express reservation to the effect that the
obligation to extradite is limited by the national laws of the country where
the accused is located. The High Contracting Party asking that an accused be
handed over for trial must furnish enough evidence of the charges against the
accused to make out a prima facile case. Since most extradition treaties do
not require the handing over of nationals of the requested state, it would
seem apparent that 6uch a state would be required to bring its nationals to
trial in its own courts.
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The creation of ad, hop tribunals to try enemy nationals accused of com-
mitting grave breaches of the Convention appears to be excluded by implication.
The common article does not prohibit, however, the trial of an individual
before a permanent international penal tribunal if the jurisdiction of the
tribunal has been recognized by the High Contracting Parties concerned. The
Diplomatic Conference expressly declined to make any decision on this point
11ft
which might hamper future development of international law.
The third paragraph of the common article dealing with the repression of
infractions of the Conventions other than enumerated grave breaches is very
vague and open to various interpretations. The French and the English texts
119do not even correspond exactly. ' It appears that the primary intention of
the Diplomatic Conference was the actual repression of breaches and as a possi-
ble secondary consideration, administrative measures to Insure respect for the
Conventions on the part of the armed forces and civilian populations of the
High Contracting Parties, M. Claude Pilloud suggests that national legislation,
after providing for the punishment of grave breaches and establishing an appro*
priate penalty for each, must Include a general clause providing for the pun-









Experts called into consultation by the International Committee of the
Red Cross in 1948 first introduced the idea of including a definition of grave
breaches in the texts of the various Conventions. It was thought necessary to
specify certain serious infractions in order to separate them from minor of-
fenses and provide for universality of treatment in their repression. It was
also thought desirable to draw public attention to the more serious infractions
as a warning to potential offenders. The texts that were adopted by the Diplo-




amendment submitted by several delegations . J The text of the article con-
tained in the First and Second Conventions is as follows:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those
involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or
property protected by the Conventiont willful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
The article in the Third Convention included everything contained in the
First and Second Conventions except the property offenses and adds the follow-
ing t
••» compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile
Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair
and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.
The article in the Fourth Convention includes everything contained in
the First and Second Conventions and adds the followingi
... unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the
forces of a hostile Power, or willfully depriving a protected per-
son of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the
present Convention, taking of hostages.,..
The categories of grave breaches are obviously very broad and must be read
in the context of the immediate post-World War II times in which they were
written. Persons and property covered by these provisions are defined in other
articles of the Conventions. Killing must be willful to be considered a grave
breach. That limitation would appear reasonable since the Conventions attempt
to regulate combat situations. The term "torture" might be open to many dif-
ferent definitions, but the broad coverage of "inhuman treatment" would appear
to cover any physical or mental harm willfully and unnecessarily inflicted
which does not amount to torture. The provisions concerning property very
closely reflect the basic complimentary doctrines of humanitarianism and mili-
tary necessity.
The prohibition of compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the armed
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forces of a hostile Power is reminiscent of article twenty-three of the Hague
Regulations of 1907, which forbade a belligerent from forcing the nationals of
126
an enemy Power to participate in actions directed against their own country.
One clause of the article appearing in the Third and Fourth Conventions raises
the violation of the rules of fair trial, contained in other articles of the
Convention, to the status of a grave breach. This was undoubtedly due to the
particular vulnerability of prisoners of war and civilians to punishment in
sham judicial proceedings.
The special prohibition in the article contained in the Fourth Convention
concerning unlawful deportation or transfer is a direct result of the experi-
ences of World War II and refers to breaches of articles forty-five and forty-
nine of that Convention. Unlawful confinement of civilians is a particularly
serious problem during the occupation of a country by the armed forces of a
hostile Power and is included as a grave breach. The taking of hostages is a
common technique of guerilla forces as well as other groups and was included










The Geneva Convention of 1929 contained provisions providing for an inquiry
into alleged violations of the Convention. It was necessary, pursuant to those
provisions, that the parties to a conflict agree on the procedure for any in-
quiry. It was obvious that the application of such a provision would be diffi-
cult and that some automatic procedure should be provided. The problem was
considered in detail by a Commission of Experts convened by the International
Committee of the Red Cross in 1937 and by the Sixteenth International Red
Cross Conference which met in London in 1938.
At the Conference of Government Experts held in Geneva in 19^+7 » the Inter-
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national Committee made several recommendations concerning Inquiry procedure
which was a result of the earlier studies. Among the more important recom-
mendations was one that a permanent authority be entrusted with the nomina-
tion of the whole or part of any Commission of Inquiry. The Government Experts
preferred that the members of such a commission be appointed by the President
of the Court of International Justice. After further study, the International
Committee submitted the following text to the 1948 Stockholm Conference
t
. . . any High Contracting Party alleging a violation of the present
Convention may demand the opening of an official enquiry.
This enquiry shall be carried out as soon as possible by a Com-
mission instituted for each particular case, and comprising three
neutral members selected from a list of qualified persons drawn
up by the High Contracting Parties in time of peace, each Party
nominating four such persons. The plaintiff and defendant States
shall each appoint one member of the Commission, The third mem-
ber shall be designated by the other two and should they disagree,
by the President of the Court of International Justice or, should
the latter be a national of a belligerent State, by the President
of the International Committee of the Red Cross. As soon as the
enquiry is closed, the Commission shall report to the Parties
concerned on the reality and nature of the alleged facts, and
may make appropriate recommendations ....
With only one minor alteration by the Stockholm Conference, the text was
submitted to the Diplomatic Conference in 1949 • The matter was referred to
the Fourth Committee of the Conference since it was intended that a common
article be prepared. The fourth Committee and its subsidiary working bodies
believed the procedure proposed was too complicated and would be unworkable
132in practice. The alternate article proposed by the Fourth Committee was
approved by the Conference without discussion and included in all four Conven-
tions. The final draft states
i
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall be
instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested
Parties, concerning any alleged violation of the Convention.
If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure for
the enquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an um-
pire who will decide upon the procedure to be follovred. Once
the violation has been established, the Parties to the conflict
shall put an end to it and shall repress it with the least
possible delay.

It is clear that an inquiry is compulsory once one of the belligerents
has asked fox it. It is equally clear that the belligerents concerned must
reach agreement on the procedure for the inquiry. As stated above, these pro-
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visions were also in the 1929 Convention and apparently were never used.
It is not difficult to understand why. It is very difficult to secure any kind
of agreement between states in time of war. The problem is compounded when it
is a question of investigating an offense which one of them is alleged to have
committed and perhaps allowing within that state gd hoc, investigators.
The second paragraph of the common article attempts to solve the problem
of agreement but only seems to move the problem to another area. The common
article does not provide for any further action if the belligerent states can-
not reach agreement on the appointment of an umpire.
Paragraph three is taken from the 1929 text. It requires that an end be
put to any violations ascertained and that they be repressed without delay.
In the context of the Conventions, repression is taken to mean penal action in
134
accordance with the articles previously discussed.
d. Article 5^ 135
In article fifty-three of the First Convention are found regulations con-
cerning the use of the emblem or the designation "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross".
Article fifty-four is designed to insure prevention of violations of those
regulations so far as possible and to punish those individuals who do violate
them. The text is short and to the point
t
The High Contracting Parties shall, if their legislation is not
already adequate, take measures necessary for the prevention and
repression, at all times, of the abuses referred to under Article 53«
This provision could have been incorporated in article forty-nine of the
First Convention as was suggested at the Diplomatic Conference, The Committee
responsible for the subject apparently overlooked enforcement of article
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fifty-three until after article forty-nine had been adopted. Article fifty-
four was then drawn up as a separate article to avoid re-opening discussion on
article forty-nine. Procedures for the enforcement of the regulations con-
tained in article fifty-three are particularly important since the 19^9 Conven-
tions substantially increased the authorized uses to which the emblems can be
put and thus rendered them more vulnerable than before.
2. Acceptance and Implementation
Within a few years most of the states in the world had ratified or acceded
to all four Conventions. Although there are several reservations to various
articles, the only one with particular bearing on the subject of this paper is
a reservation by the Soviet Union and other communist governments to article
eighty-five of the Prisoners of War Convention. That article provides that
prisoners of war are to retain the benefits of the Convention even if they are
convicted by the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture. The Sovi-
et Union and its followers refused to agree to apply that article in the case
of prisoners of war convicted or war crimes and crimes against humanity as
136defined and used by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.
The first and one of the most important obligations of the Parties to the
l°4-9 Conventions is to enact necessary legislation to provide effective penal
sanctions to enforce the Conventions. It is left up to the individual nations
to determine, at least in the first instance, whether any additional legisla-
tion is necessary. In view of the theory of universality of jurisdiction
espoused in the Conventions, it would appear necessary for the great majority
of states to enact additional penal laws to comply with the minimum requlre-
137
ments of the Conventions.
At least eight signatory states — the Netherlands, Switzerland, Yugo-
slavia, Czechoslavakia, Belgium, Ethiopia, Thailand, and the United Kingdom —
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have enacted specific legislation to implement the Conventions. Other nations,
including the United States, have considered their legislation adequate to
138
fulfill the obligations incurred by ratifying the Conventions. ' The United
States' position in this regard is rather difficult to understand. The univer-
sality of jurisdiction provisions of the Conventions are not self-executing,
and most federal and state penal statutes are limited to acts committed within
the territorial boundaries of the United States or of the state concerned.
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The Uniform Code of Military Justice J is a theoretical means for repression
of war crimes regardless of the situs of the act or the status of the actor.
As a practical matter, however, the jurisdiction of military courts has been
reduced in recent years both as to acts and actors. Although the jurisdic-
tion of courts-martial under the laws of war ante-date the United States Con-
stitution and is on firmer constitutional ground than legislation enacted pur-
1^1
suant to Congressional power, ' it appears questionable whether the United
States should rely on current military law to fulfill its obligations under
the Conventions.
III. POSSIBILITIES FOR THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS
The five traditional theories on which states usually have based claims
to jurisdiction over individuals have been discussed. There is no question
but that territoriality and nationality have been the theories most commonly
relied upon and most commonly accepted by other states. The relaxed attitude,
toward the trial of pirates has been cited as an early example of the. univer-
sality principle. While there may have been universality and passive personal-
ity concepts involved, the peculiar nature of the act of piracy and particu-
larly the fact that it usually occurred on the high seas where there was no
effective sovereign power detract from its value as a precedent.
The conferences beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century and
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continuing nearly until World War I and the resulting conventional international
law relied on states to punish their own nationals who violated the laws of
war. The same may be said of the Geneva Convention of 1929* The real genesis,
in practice, of the idea of an international tribunal to try war criminals
was in the work of the special Commission appointed by the Versailles Peace
Conference to make recommendations concerning the trial of the war criminals
of World War I. The Commission expressed a view of customary international
law based on the passive personality and universality theories of jurisdiction
and recommended an international tribunal for the trial of major war criminals.
The final version of the Versailles Treaty contained provisions for an inter-
national tribunal. All this planning came to naught as the German Government
prevailed with arguments for German trials at Leipzig which could be based on
the territoriality and nationality theories of jurisdiction. It is unknowable,
of course, whether stiff penalties meted out by Allied or international tri-
bunals after World War I would have deterred in any way the atrocities of
World War II.
The real watershed in the history of penal jurisdiction over war crimes
was the aftermath of World War II. There were three basic types of tribunals
usedi the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and for the Far East,
the United States Military Tribunals at Nuremberg, and the many Municipal
Tribunals
.
The jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunals could be con-
strued as a pooling of the competence of the various Allied Nations and based
on the territoriality, protection of interests, and passive personality prin-
ciples. On the other hand, jurisdiction could have been based on the legis-
lative power of the Allies as successor sovereigns to the German and Japanese
Governments — the traditional territoriality and nationality theories. An-
other possibility, of course, would be the universal competence of properly
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constituted tribunals to try individuals for acts such as those concerned.
The jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunals was based on
their Charters , but that begs the question since the Charters resulted from
the London Agreement. It appears that the main basis of the jurisdiction of
the International Military Tribunals was the theory of universality. In this
regard, it should be remembered that the four major Allied Powers purported
to be acting for all the United Nations} that twenty-three nations joined in
the indictment at Nuremberg} that the Charter and Judgment of the Tribunal at
Nuremberg were ratified by the General Assembly of the United Nations by resolu-
tion} and that the basic principles of the Charter of the Tribunal at Nurem-
berg were used in the Charter for the Tribunal at Tokyo as well as for the
Charter of the United States Military Tribunals at Nuremberg.
The jurisdiction of the United States Military Tribunals at Nuremberg
also relied on a basic document which, in turn, was based on permissive enact-
ments by the four occupying Allied Powers in Germany. The same comments made
concerning the Charters of the International Military Tribunals are applicable
in the case of the United States Tribunals, with possibly more stress on the
legislative powers of sovereign argument.
The Municipal Tribunals relied on all five theories of jurisdiction . The
common law countries tended more toward universality, while the civil law coun-
tries were tied more closely to municipal statutes and relied more heavily on
the principles of territoriality, nationality, and passive personality.
The trend from World War I through the aftermath of World War II was
definitely toward broader competence of tribunals to try war criminals and a
tendency toward international tribunals. This was based almost entirely on
customary international law. The tribunals themselves often were reluctant to
specify the basis of their jurisdiction, but the practice tended toward an
expanded concept of passive personality amounting to universality of juris-
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diction, particularly in the trials after World War II. The Geneva Conventions
of 19^9 provide for universality of jurisdiction in municipal tribunals of the
High Contracting Parties for grave breaches of the Conventions. This compe-
tence is certainly wider in theory than that included in any previous convention.
The current political and legal organization of the world raises grave
doubts of the practicality of using this competence to actually deter violations
of the laws and customs of war. The United Nations has been a disappointment
to most observers due to its inability to maintain peace or move the nations
of the world toward consensus in determining major problems and possible solu-
tions. The substantial paralysis of the United Nations is really just a reflec-
tion of the ideological differences — political, legal, and economic — sep-
arating the communist nations of the world, partiuclarly the Soviet Union, from
the non-communist nations. To this dichotomy must now be added the gulf be-
tween the developed nations and the underdeveloped or undeveloped nations.
The limited warfare of the nuclear era is another important factor. It
does not lend itself to the clear "good guy-bad guy" situation of World War II,
nor to clear-cut victory for one side or the other. As a result, states with
a motive for prosecuting non-nationals are unlikely to have physical custody
for trial. If custody is obtained, political considerations usually make it
more advantageous to make some disposition other than criminal prosecution.
The remainder of this paper will discuss these conditions in more detail and
explore their effects on the exercise of jurisdiction by international and
municipal tribunals.
A. EFFECTS OF THE LACK OF AN IDEOLOGICAL CONSENSUS IN THE WORLD
Ideological consensus is not necessary for agreement between nations as
to the existence of a problem or methods of solving it. A common interest
among nations is usually sufficient for joint or parallel action. There is no
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denying, however, that the lack of a common approach to situations makes the
task of identifying common interests very difficult.
!• Political Incompatibility
Political conflict between the Soviet Union and the non-communist nations
has been a constant fact of international life since 1917. The Soviet Union
cooperated with the Allied Powers during World War II despite that conflict
and because of an overriding common interest in defeating the Axis Powers.
Soon after the end of World War II it became apparent that the conflict would
Intensify and that the Soviet Union would be joined by its satellite countries
and later by China. Experience in the United Nations, as well as bi-lateral
and multi-lateral contacts between communist and non-communist nations, has
shown that very strong common interests are necessary to override national
or ideological political interests.
The concept of state sovereignty is difficult to overcome in any situation
requiring international cooperation. This is particularly true in an area as
politically charged as war crimes trials. Accusations of violations can, and
often do, reach to the highest levels of government. Even the trial of lower-
ranking members of armed forces by another nation is not looked upon with favor
by the country of nationality. States have simply not allowed such trials if
in a position to resist, even if parties to international conventions granting
such jurisdiction.
The Soviet Union, in particular, maintains a very conservative and tradi-
tional view of state sovereignty. Although Tsarist Russia had participated
fully in the international conferences of the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, the Communist regime was on the defensive about international
law from the beginning and would not tolerate any international interference
in what it considered domestic affairs. Even after the Soviet Union became
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established as a state, the nature of the authoritarian government made its
leaders extremely wary of any decision^making process which they could not
controls Since the major post-World War II trials Soviet actions have been
marked by lip service to broad jurisdictional bases so long as the forum is a
municipal tribunal instead of an international one.
It would be unfair to castigate the Soviet Union too severely for using
international law, Including the part concerned with jurisdiction over war
crimes, as a way of achieving political goals or maximizing political benefits.
All nations are so inclined, although the Soviet leaders have been more blatant
in their actions. It is interesting to note in this regard the reaction of the
United States Government to an announcement by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in July, 1966. * In that announcement the Hanoi
Government expressed its intention to try American aviators held by the DRV
for war crimes. It was contended that these aviators had attacked civilian
targets and that such attacks constituted war crimes. The precedents for
claiming that the attacks constituted war crimes are not very solid. In addi-
tion, the DRV was claiming that the Americans were not prisoners of war and
were not entitled to the benefit of the fair trial provisions of the Third
Geneva Convention. After a short but intensive United States diplomatic offen-
sive, resulting in the intervention of international figures from all over the
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world, the Hanoi Government backed down on its plans for trials.
Although the United States reaction was partially based on the statements
of the DRV indicating that the Americans were already considered guilty and
would not receive a fair trial, the major cause of the United States position
seems to have been a marked reluctance to allow American military men to be
tried by a foreign enemy nation. It is true that the DRV was probably wrong
on the substance of international law relied upon and probably intended to
violate the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention concerning fair trials.
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Nevertheless, in a strictly legal sense, the DRV had the right to try the
prisoners as war criminals. If, as a result of the trials, there were viola-
tions of the Geneva Conventions by individuals subject to them, then such in-
dividuals would be subject to trial. It is submitted, however, that there are
few nations that would not have reacted as the United States did in this case
if they had the power and influence to do so.
The reasons of both the DRV and the United States were political and prac-
tical, although couched in legal terms. The Hanoi Government wished to bring
pressure on the United States to stop the bombing and if possible disengage
Itself from the war in Southeast Asia. The proposed war crimes trials were
undoubtedly seen as a way to enlist world public opinion and United States
public opinion in aid of the political and military goals of the DRV. Whether
the alleged attacks by American aviators constituted war crimes made little
difference from a political point of view and the concept of a fair trial, even
if understood, would not be allowed to hinder the primary purpose of politi-
cal propaganda.
On the United States side, it was obvious that the DRV had no intention
of conducting impartial trials in the western sense. It was also probable
that the American aviators would be executed immediately after such trials and
before public opinion would have a chance to have much effect on Hanoi. Final-
ly, as a practical matter, the United States Government knew that if violations
of fair trial standards occurred there would be no trial of the perpetrators
because no one with a motive for prosecution, political or otherwise, would
have physical custody of them.
The non-aligned nations add another factor to the political climate.
Many of their leaders do not feel bound by customary international law, in-
cluding the law of war, since they had no part in shaping it. Many of these
so-called "third world" countries have become quite adroit at playing the
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communist world against the non-communist world in order to secure political
and economic advantage. The major communist and non-communist countries, par-
ticularly the Soviet Union, China, and the United States, seem perfectly will-
ing to deal with these countries on a purely political basis and not push for
adherence to international law.
The time', may be rapidly approaching when the nations of the world, and
particularly the smaller nations, find it in their self-interest to adhere
more closely to some form of international law. It may be, as will be discussed
later, that the substantative law of war will have to be changed to reflect
changed conditions, both political and military. If such changes will help
create the perceptions of self-interest necessary for adherence by nations of
diverse political goals, they will be well worth the effort.
2» Legal Incompatibility
Mingled with the political concepts and interests discussed in the previ-
ous section, but clearly distinguishable, are legal concepts varying from
country to country. Each political society has its own law, and in many cases
several laws co-exist in the same nation. This diversity is another factor
affecting the possibilities of exercising criminal jurisdiction over war crimes.
It is possible to detect, beyond the wide variations among particular laws,
the existence of a few general categories within which these different laws
can be grouped. "* These general categories are characterized by the way the
group defines and uses the idea of law. When trying to determine the families
into which different laws can be grouped, consideration must be given to the
more constant general elements rather than the less stable rules found in the
law at any given moment. Two criteria are deemed most important by David and
Brierlyi
Two considerations seem equally decisive for the purposes of classifi-
cation. From the technical standpoint, it is advisable to ask whether
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someone educated in the study and practice of one law will then "be
capable 8 without much difficulty, of handling another. If not, it
must be concluded that the two laws do not belong to the same family;
this may be so because of differences in the vocabularies of the two
laws (they do not express the same concepts ), or because the hier-
archy of sources and the methods of each law differ to a considerable
degree. This first criterion, no matter how essential, is neverthe-
less insufficient, and it must be complemented by a second considera-
tion. Two laws cannot be considered as belonging to the same family,
even though they employ the same concepts and techniques, if they
are founded on opposed philosophical, political or economic princi-
ples, and if they seek to achieve two entirely different types of
.^
society. These two criteria must be used cumulatively, not separately.
It is generally accepted that there are three major systems or families of law
in the world today ~ the Romano-Germanic, the Common, and the Socialist ~
as well as several philosophical or religious systems which are not "law" in
a strict, narrow sense.
The Romano-Germanic family includes those countries in which the system
of laws developed on the basis of Roman law as interpreted by the medieval
scholars. and changed by Germanic tribal custom. The rule of law is conceived
as a rule of conduct intimately linked to ideas of justice and morality. The
Romano-Germanic family of laws originated in Europe and evolved, primarily for
historical reasons, as an essentially private law, regulating the relationships
between individual citizens. Other branches of law developed later but the
private law remains the main branch of legal science.
Through reception, either voluntary or forced, the Romano-Germanic family
of law has come to be applied in many countries. Outside of Europe these laws
have their own characteristics. In some instances the receiving country pos-
sessed its own advanced civilization and some of the original institutions were
kept. In any event, old ways of acting and thinking meant that the application
of the new law was quite different from that followed in Europe.
The Common Law includes the law of England and those laws modeled on
English law. Superficially at least, there are many differences between Com-
mon Law and Romano-Germanic Law. The Common Law was and is formed primarily
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by judges in resolving individual disputes. It seeks to provide the solution
to a trial rather than to formulate a general rule of law for the future. It
is remedy-oriented and tends to be less abstract than the Romano-Germanic
family. Public law plays a much more important role in the Common Law. It was
developed as a system for the restoration of peace in those cases where the
peace of the English kingdom was threatened, or when some other important event
required or justified the intervention of royal power.
As is the. case with the Romano-Germanic family, the Common Law has expanded
considerably throughout the world as a result of reception and has suffered the
same fate of mutation when transferred to alien soil. Local practice has ac-
tually had more of an impact on the Common Law than the Romano-Germanic Law
Bince the Common Law is not normally codified and relies more on the experi-
ence of judges and a developing body of case law.
The laws of the communist countries, usually called Socialist Law, make
up the third family, more or less distinct from the other two. The communist
countries all had laws belonging to the Romano-Germanic family prior to com-
munism and still have some characteristics of Romano-Germanic Law. The family
of Socialist laws originated in the Soviet Union and spread to countries in
Eastern Europe and Asia as the political influence of the Soviet Union ex-
panded. Socialist law in the peoples republics of Europe still retains more
Romano-Germanic characteristics than in the Soviet Union reflecting the more
fully developed legal systems present when communism became dominant.
In order to understand Socialist Law, particularly in its purest- form as
practiced in the Soviet Union, it is necessary to understand the theory of
147
communism. The building of communism is the stated goal of the Soviet
Union to which all institutions, including the law, are subordinated. Accord-
ing to the theory, the law directs the economic and social engineering neces-
sary to build communism while maintaining law and order. When the economic
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and social engineering is completed the need for law will have passed, per-
mitting it to wither away. Marxism-Leninism provides the rationale for a sys-
tem of class-oriented legality. Law is considered to be a class weapon serving
the interests of the dominant class in every society. The existence of limit-
ing, eternal laws based upon such abstract ethical principles as nature, rea-
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son, or justice is rejected. When the proletariat assumes power, it uses
law against its class enemies to effect the transition to communism free of
the constraints of lav; and abstract ethics and morality. Lenin expounded this
theory clearly
i
Dictatorship is rule based directly upon force and unrestricted by
any laws. The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is rule
won and maintained by the use of violence by the proletariat against
the bourgeoisie, rule that is unrestricted by any laws.^°
...We repudiate all morality taken apart from human society and
classes ... We say that our morality is entirely subordinated to
the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. Our moral-
ity is derived from the interests of the class struggle of the
proletariat.
...We sayi morality is what serves to destroy the old exploiting
society and to unite all toilers around the proletariat, which is
building up a new, communist society. ->®
Many Socialist legal institutions are very similar to institutions in
other families of law. This results from the fact that there are certain prob-
lems and needs which are common to all political societies, and there are prac-
tical considerations which militate against radical solutions. Where authori-
tarian rule and the building of communism do not create special needs, socialist
institutions and laws operate much as they do in other continental European
countries. This is a reflection of the fact that Socialist Law is really a
Romano-Germanic system with a veneer, sometimes thick, of new institutions or
changes in traditional institutions resulting from the needs of communist theory
151
and the necessary authoritarian rule.
Aside from the three families of law just discussed, there are several
systems of rules effective in the world of a religious or philosophical rather
than a juridical nature. The word "law" is used to designate these systems
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of rules "because they fill the role in certain areas of human conduct, which
elsewhere has devolved upon law.
Islamic law is probably the most important of these systems. It is not
the law of any Mohammedan state but the sum of rules derived from the Muslim
152
religion concerning human relationships. "* Muslim law fills the role left
vacant in various countries by the rules of other laws, particularly in the
regulation of such important kinds of human relationships as the law of persons,
the family, and successions. In- addition, in countries whose civilization has
been molded by Islam, the principles of Islamic Law may sustantially affect
the way law received from the West is interpreted and applied in practice.
Other religious-philosophical systems exist in India and the Far East and
local customs not rising to the status of systems in Africa. These systems and
customs, including Muslim Law, do not appear to have the widespread influence
to contribute materially to the legal incompatibility of the world or to its
possible solution.
The legal Incompatibility which seems to be a major factor affecting the
exercise of war crimes jurisdiction is the conflict between the Romano-Germanic
and Common Law families on the one hand and the Socialist family on the other.
This is undoubtedly influenced to some extent by the political incompatibility
of the countries representing communism and those that do not.
The Romano-Germanic and Common Law families have developed side by side
over the centuries. Both families grew in the soil of western civilization,
and there have been numerous contacts between them. In fact, some political
societies have a combination of the two families, which seem amenable to mix-
153ing. The methods employed by each family tend to be much alike, and very
similar substantive solutions inspired by the same idea of justice are provided
by both. This similarity, at least when compared to the concepts underlying
Socialist Law, allows us to speak of a Western family of law standing concep-
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tually in stark contrast and opposed to the Socialist family.
The attempt at agreement on common legal norms and procedures concerning
war crimes has previously been discussed in relation to the London Conference. -^
There the Soviet concept of political expediency as opposed to the western con-
cept of justice propounded by France, Britain, and the United States was clearly
visible. The fact that an international tribunal was created more or less along
western lines reflected the prevailing balance of power and the Soviet desire
to see Germany branded an international outlaw. There seems to be no reason
to believe that any of the western concepts rubbed off on the Soviet delegates
or that the western delegates were favorably influenced by the Soviet arguments.
Today the balance of power has shifted, and the satellites and adherents
picked up by the Soviet Union since World Mar II give greater weight and influ-
ence to the Socialist view. The big question to be answered, so far as war
crimes trials are concerned, is whether there is enough common ground between
the two sides to allow the exercise of internationally conceded jurisdiction.
Armed conflicts in the foreseeable future are likely to involve adherents to
both Western and Socialist Law. Unless a functional international tribunal is
created or unless ways are found to aid the jurisdiction of municipal tribunals,
taking into account the political and legal diversity of the world, the pros-
pects for adequate sanctions against individual violators of the laws of war
do not appear favorable.
B. EFFECTS OF LIMITED WARFARE
In addition to the political and legal problems affecting the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction over individual violators of the laws of war, the very
nature of warfare as practiced today has a major impact. Even before the advent
of nuclear weapons, there was a growing opinion among knowledgeable people




role as a method of resolving international conflicts, -^ The development of
sophisticated and powerful nuclear weapons and the equally efficient delivery-
systems available to modern superpowers have succeeded in making unlimited
warfare an unacceptable tool of national policy to rational world leaders.
Self-interest has dictated the maintenance of such arsenals but at the S3<me
time has made the costs of their use unacceptably high. The costs of fighting
wars with so-called "conventional" weapons, however, are still considered bear-
able by most nations, if national self-interest is perceived to be involved to
a sufficient degree.
1. Characteristics of Limited Warfare
There are at least two general types of limited warfare. One type involves
major powers directly opposed to each other or one or more major powers in-
volved in a conflict between smaller countries or non-governmental groups. In
either case the major powers are "pulling their punches" in order not to let
the situation escalate into an unacceptable unlimited war. The other type of
limited warfare involves two or more less powerful countries or groups that are
not capable of inflicting the awesome damage possible with modern technology.
In this case the belligerents can use all of their resources without endanger-
ing the rest of the world militarily. It is quite possible, of course, that
a conflict between two or more relatively weak belligerents will be joined by
one or more major powers and create a conflict of the type first discussed.
1 ^ft
With the exception of the Korean War, pitting the United States and
China against each other, and the Cuban missile crisis, •" involving the United
States and the Soviet Union, the major powers have managed to avoid a direct
confrontation since World War II. Even these two situations do not really
qualify as warfare between major powers. China probably was not capable of
exerting more military force than was exerted during the Korean War and should
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not "be classified as a major military power, at least as of that time. The
Cuban missile confrontation seems to have been a much more dangerous situation
from a nuclear standpoint since both the United States and the Soviet Union
undoubtedly possessed the capability to engulf the world in a catastrophic
unlimited war. In that case, however, a "shooting" war never occurred because
the Soviet Union backed down in the face of an overwhelming United States'
conventional seapower superiority.
The more pervasive type of conflict since World V/ar II and the type which
seems more likely to occur in the future is warfare characterized by struggles
of various groups for independence or for control of the government of a rela-
tively weak nation. These movements may arise from within the groups involved
or may be instigated by the major powers for political or economic reasons.
In any case, one or more major powers are likely to become interested and par-
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ticipate to a greater or lesser extent. Experience has shown that this kind
of war is fought on political as well as military fronts and involves the total
population of the geographical area involved. Guerrilla warfare and the use
of terror as a weapon is the usual result.
Successful guerrilla warfare depends on stealth, hit-and-run attacks, and
clandestine operations. Many of the substantive provisions of the law of war
cannot be observed by guerrillas if they wish to be successful. Indeed, some
provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 19^9, such as the necessity of wearing
a distinctive sign and carrying arms openly in order to be protected by the
1 59Prisoners of War Convention would be tantamount to suicide. Other norms of
the international law of war, both customary and conventional, such as the
treatment of prisoners of war and non-combatants, would appear to be very diffi-
cult for guerrillas to abide by.
Irregular warfare also poses serious problems for the forces opposing
guerrillas, oven if those forces are organized and operate in a moro conven-
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tional manner. The conventional forces find it very difficult to identify
the lawful combatants of their enemy. The guerrillas fight and fade back into
the general population only to emerge at another time and another place. The
local population often assists the guerrillas, either from sympathy or from
fear. The conventional forces usually have superior firepower but are unable
to use it effectively because the guerrillas will not stand still to fight
pitched battles and have few permanent bases. It is difficult for the conven-
tional forces to know how to treat captured personnel since they normally do
not fall into one of the neat categories provided by the traditional law of
war.
Finally, this type of limited warfare often does not result in a clear
military decision. The complicated political aspects of these conflicts result
in tactical and strategic military actions which only vaguely reflect military
realities. Political compromise between the belligerents as well as interested
third parties tend to produce settlements which leave the situation little
changed by the fighting. Warfare of this kind does not seem to be so much a
way of resolving international disputes as it is a method of testing relative
strengths and weaknesses and the resolve of various groups and nations.
2* Limitations on the Exercise of Jurisdiction Imposed by Limited Warfare
The exercise of criminal jurisdiction over alleged war criminals has proven
to be a difficult matter even in the relatively simple days of World War II.
Those problems have been compounded by the characteristics of modern limited
warfare.
So far as guerrilla and other less powerful forces are concerned, the
problems are several-fold. As with other combatants, they are unlikely to have
physical custody of the higher ranking military or civilian officials of their
opponents. If they do capture members of enemy forces who are deemed to have
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committed war crimes, guerrillas usually lack the facilities or institutions
160
necessary for any semblance of a fair trial by a "duly constituted court"
.
Indeed, even the taking and keeping of prisoners of war places a heavy- burden
on fast-moving guerrilla forces. It is not hard to believe that "military
necessity" in the pre-World War I German sense may prevail more often than not
in actual practice. Concerning prisoners, the War Book issued by the German
War Office shortly after the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 stated
1
That prisoners should only be killed in the event of extreme necessity,
and that only the duty of self-preservation and the security of one's
own State can justify a proceeding of this kind is today universally
admitted. 161
If prisoners deemed to be war criminals are taken by such forces it may be more
advantageous to exploit them politically than to try them for war crimes. North
Vietnamese and National Liberation Front (NLF) treatment of American prisoners
is a case in point. So long as the prisoners were alive and in the public eye
they could be exploited for political advantage. War crimes trials not only
could provide a splash of publicity but also concern about justice from many
parts of the world. Apparently it was considered more advantageous to threaten
trials in order to keep up the political pressure on the United States Govern-
ment through the families and friends of the prisoners concerned. The prisoners
were also valuable to the Hanoi Government in maintaining its control over its
own forces and the civilian population of North Vietnam. In this connection,
the actions of the DRV in exhibiting American prisoners to hostile civilian
crowds to stimulate support is significant. On July 6, 1966, the DRV caused
several American prisoners, handcuffed in pairs, to be marched through the
crowd-lined streets of Hanoi. The incident also was intended for external ef-
1 f\0 1 f\'\
feet since it was broadcast by Radio Hanoi, " and press releases and photo-
164-
graphs were issued by the official North Vietnamese press agency. In Ilay,
1967, a French news agency reported from Hanoi that three American pilots, one




Hanoi and later put on display at the International Press Club in Hanoi.
Both these actions and others which undoubtedly occurred are violations of
both articles three and thirteen of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention and
probably violations of the customary law of war. The significance for the
purposes of this paper, however, is not that the acts violated substantive pro-
visions of the law of war, but that they were apparently seen as a politically
attractive alternative to trials for war crimes. The United States Government
may have assisted in making it politically attractive by its violent reaction
to proposed trials.
Another factor bearing on guerrilla type forces, already alluded to, is
the kind of settlement likely to come out of limited war. The military out-
come is inconclusive and the settlement is basically the transfer of the con-
flict to a less violent plane rather than to dictate the solution of the conflict.
The irregular forces are not defeated and will not agree to any settlement that
will not allow them to continue their fight in a political and economic, and
perhaps covert military, manner. Since neither side is in a position to dic-
tate the settlement, enemy nationals in the hands of each party are usually
returned to their own authorities rather than retained to be tried as war crira-
166inals. If agreement cannot be reached on the political disposition of these
prisoners, there is likely to be no settlement at all.
Even if irregular type forces were able to obtain custody of enemy nationals
accused of war crimes and not forced to give them up as a condition of some kind
of settlement, world opinion might be very unfavorable to any trials conducted.
The difficulty irregular forces face in constituting tribunals recognized in-
1 ^R
ternationally as competent has previously been discussed. The common prac-
169tice of insurgent groups, particularly those with communist backing, of
labeling all of their enemies as war criminals without benefit of trial adds
to the uneasiness of non-communist observers concerning the basic fairness of
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any trials conducted. In Vietnam the DRV and the Viet Cong have maintained
170
that the Geneva Conventions do not apply at all s and hence, the American
prisoners are not entitled to the fair trial provisions of the Prisoners of
War Convention
More conventional type forces engaging in limited warfare also face prob-
lems in exercising jurisdiction over alleged war criminals. Some of these
problems are much the same as those faced by irregular forces! lack of physi-
cal custody of those accused; no clear-cut military decision; a political set-
tlement with no provision for war crimes trials. Other limitations bear harder
on parties using conventional forces. It is very difficult to place respon-
sibility within an irregular organization if, in fact, there is much of an or-
ganization. Most political and military leaders are unknown and such organi-
zation as there is tends to be very decentralized. In a conflict such as Viet-
nam, in which irregular forces either could not or did not comply with many
uncontroverted substantive norms of international law, it would be theoretically
possible to try as war criminals a large proportion of the military forces of
the DRV operating in South Vietnam as well as many erstwhile South Vietnamese
civilians, including most of the members of the NLF.
The credibility for conducting basically fair trials for foreign nationals
accused of war crimes is probably higher for those well-established governments
most likely to use conventional forces in a limited war. Because they are es-
tablished governments, however, with official contacts with other governments
and domestic political problems, they are more susceptible to some types of
pressure against war crimes trials or war crimes related trials than irregular
forces. The International influence now being exerted against Bangledesh to re-
patriate Pakistani prisoners of war rather than try them, in order to get some
171kind of formal settlement of that conflict, is one type of pressure. More
direct pressure against trials by the Government of South Vietnam was exerted
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by the NLF. On April 9» 19&5» a Viet Cong guerrilla was tried by a South Viet-
namese court for acts of terrorism. He was convicted and sentenced to death.
The NLF immediately announced that if the sentence was carried out they would
172
execute an American Aid Officer previously captured. The sentence of the
South Vietnamese court was not carried out, and apparently that matter was
dropped. On June 22, 19&5* a Viet Cong guerrilla was executed by a firing
squad after he had been tried and convicted of terrorism by a South Vietnamese
court. The guerrilla had been apprehended in Saigon while attaching a fuse to
173
a bomb that would have exploded five minutes later. ' A few days after the
execution NLF broadcasts announced that an American soldier held prisoner by
the NLF had been executed in reprisal for the execution of the Viet Cong guer-
17^-
rilla. On September 22, 1965 » three Viet Cong guerrillas were executed after
having been convicted of terrorism and sentenced to death by a South Vietnamese
court. On September 26, the NLF announced that they had retaliated by execut-
175ing two American prisoners of war. In all cases the NLF specifically iden-
tified the victims of their reprisals. .Undeniably, the directing of reprisals
against prisoners of war violated both customary and conventional rules of the
law of war. For the purposes of this analysis, however, the most interesting
aspects are that the reprisals were taken because of the carrying out of sen-
tences of duly constituted courts} that the reprisals were committed despite
and in contempt of the preponderance of world public opinion; and that the re-
prisals were taken against United States nationals rather than South Vietnam-
ese nationals, even though the trials had taken place in South Vietnamese courts.
The NLF wanted the trials, or at least the executions, stopped despite the ap-
parent jurisdiction of the South Vietnamese courts and obviously thought that
the pressure used would have more effect against the United States Government
than the South Vietnamese Government. Apparently the NLF read the situation




stopped almost immediately, presumably dxie to United States' pressure.
Domestic political forces cannot only exert pressure to prevent trials of
foreign nationals "but can also exert tremendous pressure to prevent the trial
of nationals of the prosecuting power. Because of nationalism and other fac-
tors, this is true in any type of conflict. It seems to be particularly true
in countries using conventional forces in limited wars against irregular forces.
While such a war may not be as politically popular as a general war such as
World War II and the military may not be held in as high esteem, the public
seems to sympathize with the problem of combating guerrillas and feel in some
vague way that guerrilla warfare is "unfair" when practiced against their own
forces. The result may be to lump actions which clearly constitute war crimes
and violations of domestic military law into the same category with question-
able actions taken as a result of the unconventional behavior of the opposing
forces. This kind of thinking not only can lead to a lack of public pressure
for the trial of nationals of a potential prosecuting state but can actually
hinder the military forces of the state in attempts to prosecute individuals
177for disciplinary or other reasons.
The nature of limited warfare, together with the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions of 19^9» make trial in an international tribunal very unlikely at
this time. Trial in the duly constituted courts of a nation not directly
involved in the conflict would be authorized under the universality concepts
of both customary and conventional law. A practical problem here is that if
prisoners are transferred across borders to another country under detention
179
and without extradition they are Ipso facto considered free. Guerrilla
forces usually do not have extradition treaties with countries, and those parties
to a conflict which have the status of states and have extradition treaties
with other countries would be subject to the same pressures discussed earlier
in reference to trials in their own courts. Even if the legal and political
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problems of transferring accused individuals to a non-participating state could
be overcome, finding such states willing to take on such a responsibility in
today's "power bloc" world might prove very difficult.
G. PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
Ideally, an international tribunal should be the best place to try an
individual accused of war crimes. A properly constituted international court
with adequate jurisdiction and sanctioning powers would avoid many of the prob-
lems associated with war crimes trials in municipal courts. If an accused is
tried before the municipal tribunal of an enemy or former enemy state, cries
of political persecution and lack of fair trial fill the air. If the accused
is tried before a municipal tribunal of his own state, equally loud cries of
coverup and whitewash are heard. In addition, an international court may be
the only practical bar of justice before which higher-ranking civilian and mili-
tary officials may be brought, short of the complete collapse of their nation.
There is no inherent reason why an international court could not be created to
hear charges of war crimes as well as other international crimes. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice functions to a limited extent in adjudicating disputes
between states, and the ad. hoc tribunals following World War II are solid pre-
cedents for granting jurisdiction over Individuals accused of war crimes to
international bodies.
In trying to determine why more progress has not been made in creating
international machinery for imposing criminal sanctions against individuals,
it is necessary to examine the possible approaches to the problem within the
political, legal, and military context previously discussed. The possibilities
that readily come to mind aret ad. hoc courts created in response to particular
situations! expanding the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
to include the authority to hear criminal charges against individuals j a new
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international court or courts with criminal jurisdiction over individuals} or
an international fact-finding body with quasi-judicial poviers but without formal
sanctioning authority.
1« Ad Hoc Tribunals
The aji h&c tribunals convened after World War II have been discussed at
length. Those courts were created to deal with obviously criminal acts, and
their primary job was to determine the involvement of the individuals brought
before them. They were created in an almost ideally favorable climate of na-
tional cooperation and public opinion, but, even under such favorable conditions,
the impermanent nature of the tribunals left much to be desired. Any court
hastily assembled to deal with the legal residue of an international conflict
is almost surely going to smack of retribution. It will lack the tradition
and prestige that only continuous operation and availibility can give.
Aside from the inherent weaknesses of ad, hoc tribunals, the present world
context casts a further shadow over the possibilities of such organs exercis-
ing criminal jurisdiction. The Geneva Conventions of 1$&9 seem to rule out
ad hoc tribunals as forums for trials arising from grave breaches of those con-
1 R1
ventions. Certainly, the political conflict between the communist and non-
communist worlds would make a widely-based agreement to create such a tribunal
very difficult to obtain. Without such an agreement, including the concurrence
of both the Soviet Union and the United States, an international court could
not be expected to command the acceptance necessary to function effectively.
The legal differences between the two major world camps would undoubtedly have
a retarding effect on the creation and operation of temporary courts. It would
probably be more of a negative factor in the relatively short life of a tempo-
rary court than in the continuing activities of a permanent court. Day to day
contacts between the systems over a long period of time, as would be the case
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on a permanent court, would tend to "blunt the sharp points of difference and
make for more areas of agreement. The personal relationships developed among
judges might blur ideological differences. Ad hoc tribunals would have neither
of these advantages and would have the additional burden of trying to begin
operation in the midst of a particularly stressful situation.
The impact of limited warfare on the exercise of jurisdiction by interna-
tional bodies is possibly the most devastating of all. By its very nature,
limited warfare is restricted geographically and to a relatively small number
of participants. The conflict and the excesses associated with it would not
likely engage the interest and attention of the entire world as would a general
war such as World War II. The non-governmental groups and small countries play-
ing the most direct roles in such warfare cannot be expected to accept with
enthusiasm an international court dominated by the major powers. Yet, assuming
the intense interest and involvement of the major powers in almost any con-
flict today, any tribunal would have to have the confidence and support of at
least the Soviet Union and the United States to effectively implement its de-
cisions. Ad. hoc tribunals face all the problems of other international bodies
arising from the nature of limited warfare as well as special ones.
It is often difficult for non-governmental groups to negotiate interna-
tional agreements of any kind and agreement concerning an international court
would be no exception. The political aspects of modern warfare coupled with
the involvement of the civilian population create difficult legal problems even
for well-established courts. The problems would be much more difficult for
parties trying to establish an ad, hoc body or for such a body attempting to
adjudicate actual cases. It would also seem to be very difficult for small,
underdeveloped countries as well as non-governmental groups to find represen-
tatives for such a tribunal with the required training and experience. Finally,
the agreements purporting to end limited conflicts are a result of political
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expediency rather than some concept of justice. National political priorities
are not likely to stress the establishment of a special war crimes tribunal.
2. International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice has the advantage of being a permanent
court with established procedures. All members of the United Nations are par-
ties to the Statute of the Court, '" although many States have filed serious
reservations in acceding to its jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is, of course,
limited to States. 183
The International Court of Justice has not been bold in asserting its
184jurisdiction in the past and would be unlikely to change even if Its juris-
diction were enlarged. The reasons for the diffidence on the part of the Court
are the same political and legal conflicts between the communist and non-commu-
nist blocs discussed in other contexts. So long as those conflicts persist in
their present form, it is highly improbable that the pertinent decision-makers
will enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court or, if enlarged, that the jurisdic-
would be exercised with much effect.
If the political and legal problems could be overcome or reduced so that
the International Court of Justice could function as a criminal court, it would
have distinct advantages over an ad. hoc tribunal. Its very permanence and pres-
tige would tend to make it effective in. dealing with the results of limited
war. As an organ of the United Nations it could also draw on the support and




The concept of a permanent international criminal court has been discussed
and analyzed for many years. 3 The United Nations produced a draft code for
186
an International Criminal Court, but agreement was never reached on actually
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establishing the Court. The traditional concept of State sovereignty as well
as articles two (one) and seven of the United Nations Charter have been cited
in arguments against establishing such a tribunal.
As discussed in relation to the International Court of Justice, a perma-
nent court has several advantages over a temporary body. In order to estab-
lish a completely new court, however, as opposed to expanding the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice, it would be necessary to start anew on
problems of composition, procedure, and staffing. The new court might or might
not be related to the United Nations, but in any event, it would have to start
at the bottom in establishing its independence and effectiveness.
The establishment and functioning of an international criminal court faces
the same legal and political obstacles as the International Court of Justice.
A regional approach, such as that used by the Council of Europe to deal with
1 P7
human rights, ' might gain acceptance more easily. The Organization of Amer-
ican States has also approved an American Convention on Human Rights, which is
not yet in effect.
Regional courts could serve a useful purpose not only in intraregional
disputes but in interregional ones as well. It is assumed that such courts
would be conceded universal jurisdiction over any individual lawfully brought
before it by a member state with physical custody of the individual. This as-
sumption seems reasonable since international law recognizes such competence
in each member state in most instances. Member states could fulfill their ob-
ligations under the Geneva Conventions of 19^9 by agreeing to the jurisdiction
of a regional tribunal. Such a tribunal would probably be considered an "inter-
national court" within the context of the Conventions. Non-governmental groups
might be allowed to become parties to a regional court and would thus be pro-
vided with a lawful forum for trying Individuals in their custody. Non-member
nations would be much more likely to accept the trial of their nationals before
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a regional court than "before the court of a member state or non-governmental
group. The court would tend to be more impartial, and the proceedings would
be open to public scrutiny. International public pressure in favor of accept-
ing the decisions of the court would be greater because of the collective
approach. Although the trial of individuals accused of war crimes would be
only one of the tasks of regional human rights tribunals, such courts would
have all the advantages of other permanent courts.
In order to expand the jurisdiction of existing or planned regional courts
to encompass war crimes and to create new courts with such jurisdiction, the
common interests inherent in effectively sanctioning violations must be acknow-
ledged by the states and groups concerned. The same common interests exist on
a world-wide scale, but it should be easier to reach a consensus on a regional
level. The fact that the effective enforcement of the law of war is really a
human rights question should make the expansion of the European and American
systems less difficult. A regional tribunal under the auspices of the Organi-
zation of American States might prove to be even more important than the Euro-
pean court. The political, economic, and social conditions in many American
countries are less stable than in Europe and more likely to precipitate limited
wars.
The regional systems in effect or proposed should be encouraged to broaden
their scope to include sanctions against individuals guilty of war crimes.
Hopefully, other regional organizations with judicial organs would develop in
Asia and Africa in order that a regional tribunal would be available to protect
human and material values in any conflict situation.
4, Fact-Finding Body Without Sanctioning Power
In an effort to find a workable system through which the moral and politi-
cal force of world opinion can be brought to focus on individuals, serious
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consideration should be given to establishing an international body with broad
fact-finding powers but with no direct sanctioning power. Such a tribunal would
need wide powers of subpoena and access to trouble spots in order to make deter-
minations of fact concerning acts which might be violations of the law of war
and the involvement of particular individuals in such acts. Once the fact-
finding task was completed, the results could be made public, utilising all
the impact of the modern press and media on national and public opinion. The
jurisdiction of the court would not extend to the application of international
law to the facts to determine individual guilt. That would be left to the
municipal tribunals with physical custody of the individuals. Depending on
the legal system involved, the municipal courts might take the facts determined
by the international tribunal as final and proceed to apply the law to decide
guilt or innocence in particular cases. Other courts might have a full-scale
trial to determine the facts in each individual case. In any event, the actual
criminal sanctions, in the event of a finding of guilty, would be applied by
municipal tribunals.
This type of international tribunal with limited jurisdiction might prove
more effective in the long run than plans for a full-scale criminal court. It
should be easier to bring into existence since it impinges less on state sov-
ereignty. No individual could be sentenced by the international body. Actual
criminal sanctions could only be applied by municipal courts after being satis-
fied of guilt. Nations with physical custody of individuals named in fact-
finding reports could always elect to ignore apparently incriminating evidence
and simply not exercise jurisdiction. Since, in most cases, nations will have
physical custody of their own nations, the final decision would usually be a
domestic one. If individuals were in the custody of an enemy nation or group,
the legal decision would be made by that decision-maker but only after an inde-
pendent finding of facts. It would probably be advisable, at least in the
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beginning, to limit the international fact-finding body to situations involving
the possible commission of traditional war crimes and prohibit it from making
determinations involving the reasons for the conflict or the justness of the
positions of various nations and groups.
Political and legal differences would still be present under such a plan
but should be muted due to the modest powers of the tribunal. It would surely
be easier for governments and other groups to find common ground for agreement
if the court limited its investigations generally to the actions of individuals
and had no sanctioning powers. Legal differences vrould not be as important
since the proposed international body would not apply any law in order to assess
guilt. There would undoubtedly be some compromise necessary, however, even on
fact-finding procedure. The permissibility of cross-examination of witnesses
and its form is one area that immediately comes to mind.
The two-step approach might also help solve some, but not all, of the
problems caused by the nature of limited warfare. Parties vrould be more likely
to allow access to investigate to an international body than to an adversary.
Reports of an international tribunal would tend to have more effect on the pop-
ulation of states and other groups having custody of accused individuals than
would allegations of war crimes by an opposing party. An international fact-
finding tribunal could not prevent the use of terrorism or other pressure to
prevent trials, but well-documented reports from a respected international
court should reduce the use of such tactics. States not parties to a particu-
lar conflict might be more willing to accept accused individuals for trial if
they had before them the report of an impartial international fact-finding
court.
The creation and operation of such a body would not be easy. The history
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of the inquiry procedures under the Red Cross Conventions is not a happy one.




some success s indicating that it is possible, By limiting the investigations
to situations primarily involving individuals} and affecting governments only
if the actions investigated were governmental policy, the tribunal or its inves-
tigating teams should encounter less resistence than similar groups have in
the past 9 Hopefully the prestige and moral power of such a tribunal would
evolve to the point where it would be possible to gradually enlarge its juris-
diction without encountering overpowering opposition.
D. PROSPECTS FOR MUNICIPAL TRI3UNAL3
Experience has shown that governments and non-governmental groups are
generally unable to perceive or unwilling to acknowledge their common interests
in criminal sanctions against violators of the law of war to the extent neces-
sary to establish a full-scale international criminal court. Although it has
been stated that ideally an international court would be the best place to try
individuals accused of war crimes, international law does not limit jurisdiction
to such a court. In fact, the Geneva Conventions of 194-9 take the opposite
tack ~ granting immediate jurisdiction to municipal courts and jurisdiction
to any future international court that the nations concerned can agree on. The
universality principle has become so well-established in international law that
municipal courts probably have jurisdiction in any event. As stated in the
Eichmann Judgment!
Therefore, so far from international law negating or limiting the
jurisdiction of countries with respect to such crimes, in the ab-
sence of an International Court, the international law is in need
of the judicial and legislative authorities of every country, to
give effect to its penal injunctions and to bring criminals to
trial. 191
Municipal, courts have the advantage of being part of an established, func-
tioning judicial system. If they can be used to effectively sanction violators
of the law of war then a very desirable deterrent will be established.
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1, Trial of Nationals of States Other Than the State Exercising Jurisdiction
The hundreds of municipal trials conducted after World War II have been
192discussed previously. A very large percentage of those trials involved the
trial of a national of a state other than that under whose auspices the tri-
bunal was convened. Of course, there were trials of nationals of the states
exercising jurisdiction, and the Soviet Union continued such trials until at
193least the beginning of this decade. The situation after World War II was
very favorable to the exercise of municipal jurisdiction on the part of the
victorious Allies. They had custody of anyone they could find, and public opin-
ion overwhelmingly supported such trials. As was the case with the international
tribunals, the enormity of the crimes left very little for the courts to do in
many cases except to decide the extent of the involvement of the particular
individual being tried. That was surely true in regard to the organizations
194
found by the International Tribunal at Nuremberg to .be criminal.
As with all other aspects of the law of war, ther have been major changes
wrought by the current political and military context. The legal context has
not really changed — serious differences certainly existed after 'World War II —
but the national interests of various countries, particularly the Soviet Union
and the United States, as perceived by their leaders, have changed. This dif-
ference in perception has most assuredly been caused to a great extent by the
very same political (i.e., the "cold war" between the communist and non-commu-
nist nations) and military (i.e., limited warfare in all its variations) con-
siderations already discussed.
The political schism between the two major blocs makes the exercise of
jurisdiction over a non-national particularly unlikely. The basic mistrust
existing makes common interests difficult to see. That mistrust is fueled by
the fact that the political differences are so ideologically charged. Communist
theory cannot tolerate cooperation with capitalist countries except in the most
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peripheral areas. Of course , the theory is not always followed in practice.
On the other side, many western leaders can see nothing good about nations that
espouse communism and feel that the best way to handle them is to have as lit-
tle contact as possible. The governments in power do not always hold these
views, however, and those that do do not always follow them.
At this time law, particularly international law, cannot span the politi-
cal gap and overcome the differences. The non-communist nations do not believe
that their nationals can receive a fair and impartial trial in a communist
country or in one backed by a communist country. Even a slight knowledge of
communist legal and political theory and practice lends credence to that belief.
The communist group, led by the Soviet Union, have a strong historical distrust
of international law as a threat to their domestic political systems. J The
usual lack of a strong legal heritage of their own makes it very difficult for
them to understand an independent judicial system basically free from politi-
cal pressures. That is not to say that communist fears are entirely baseless.
Even strong judicial systems may bend under the public pressures of trying the
nationals of an enemy or former enemy.
The political problems are complicated further by the involvement of small,
underdeveloped nations and non-governmental groups. Even if the major powers
backing these participants wished to encourage the exercise of criminal juris-
diction over foreign nationals and to assure fair trials, they would be facing
an impossible task in some cases. The non-governmental groups usually have no
judicial system at all, and the small nations involved are often as underdevel-
oped politically and legally as they are economically. Their political and
legal systems and standards may work well and fit the needs of their situation
and yet be completely unacceptable to more developed nations for the trial of
their nationals.
Current military realities also mitigate against the exercise of juris-

75
diction over foreign nationals. Guerrilla warfare makes it very difficult for
both the guerrilla and his more conventional opponent. These difficulties were
discussed in the preceding section dealing with problems imposed by limited
warfare in general, as were the problems arising from the political nature of
the so-called "settlement agreements" ending at least one phase of modern con-
flicts. 1?6
The prospects for the exercise of municipal jurisdiction over foreign
nationals accused of war crimes looks very dim to this writer. The establish-
ment of an international fact-finding body might stimulate the exercise of this
jurisdiction to a certain extent but would probably prove to be more beneficial
in aiding the exercise of municipal jurisdiction over nationals of the prose-
cuting state.
2. Trial of Nationals of the State Exercising Jurisdiction
Almost all of the conventions entered into since the middle of the nine-
teenth century laying down rules for the conduct of war have primarily relied
on each nation to punish its own nationals for violations of the established
197
norms. " It is much simpler legally and politically for nations to try their
own nationals. The problem, of course, is that nations usually perceive no
motive for prosecuting their own people for allegedly violating the law of war.
In order to enhance the prospects for the exercise of jurisdiction by
nations over their own nationals, it will be necessary to show that by substan-
tially complying with the law of war advantages can be obtained militarily,
politically, and economically. Militarily, the complying nation gains in
increased discipline and efficiency among its armed forces as well as by not
198
provoking the enemy to greater efforts. Compliance is particularly reward-
ing politically in limited war situations since there will be many spectator
nations and groups as well as the general public who will be judging the actions
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of the participants. In open societies „ such as the United States, compliance
should also be politically rewarding domestically, resulting in greater public
support for the war effort. The economy of force resulting from observing the
law of war would result in less expense to the participants, whether charac-
terized in terms of human or material values.
Convincing participants in warfare that their best interests lie in polic-
ing themselves will not be easy. The most difficult problem undoubtedly will
be in assuring that the overall policies of the governments themselves are
within the guidelines of accepted norms. Subordinate military personnel are
not likely to be prosecuted and probably should not be prosecuted for carrying
out the orders of their governments in areas of doubtful legality. Clear cases
of illegal governmental strategy, such as that of Germany in World War II, are
one thing, while new techniques of guerrilla warfare and responses to guerrilla
warfare are another. If respected international legal scholars cannot agree
on the exact norms of international law as applied to limited warfare it is
unfair to place that burden on the military forces of the participants. The
substantive rules themselves must be realistically brought up-to-date with
current military and political conditions before there is much hope of persuad-
ing nations to comply and insure that their military forces comply.
No particularly serious problems should be encountered because some partic-
ipants are non-governmental groups. The leaders of those groups understand
military and political reality as well as those of established nations, and
they have an even greater need for economy of force, due to the availability
of fewer resources. In order to have any organization at all, these groups
must have internal order and discipline. This requires some procedure for
"trying" individuals accused of deviating from the group norms. That machinery
can be used for punishing members who violate the law of war if the group
leaders perceive that conforming to the law of war is in the best interests
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of the group. Again, it is absolutely necessary for the substantive law of
war to be made realistic to these groups before there is much hope for compli-
ance.
The international fact-finding court suggested in the previous section
could be of great assistance in prodding recalcitrant nations into action.
There is no question but that the effect would be greater on nations with open
societies. Their governments must necessarily pay greater and more prompt
attention to public opinion. Nations with authoritarian governments could not
be pressured so easily, but the effort might still be effective. It is also
quite possible that it will be harder and take longer to convince communist
and other authoritarian governments and groups that it is in their best inter-
ests to assure compliance with reasonable rules of warfare. That is no reason
why the western nations, and particularly the United States, should not take
the lead. If compliance truly is advantageous, unilateral compliance should
be even more advantageous. Considered from every angle, trial of accused vio-
lators by their own states seems to offer the best hope of effective criminal
sanctions against violators of the law of war in the foreseeable future.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
It has been an established fact throughout history that force in some form
is necessary to insure order in even the best regulated and most homogeneous
societies. International society is neither well-regulated nor homogeneous,
and the right of nations and some non-governmental groups to use force in cer-
tain circumstances is recognized by International law. Sometimes that force
is used to enhance inclusive values and sometimes for exclusive purposes, but
in any case there is much to be gained in human and material values by regu-
lating and limiting the types and amounts of force used. The substantive law
of war, both conventional and customary, lays down the rules to be followed
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by participants and non-participants alike to achieve the greatest possible
conservation of these essential values. Sanctions of various kinds have been
used in an attempt to insure the observance of the substantive norms. Criminal
prosecution of individuals accused of violating those norms is one such sanction.
Some commentators feel that criminal prosecution is no deterrent to the
199
commission of war crimes. That is probably true for the leaders of nations
and groups since the type of individual who aspires to great power or who is
imbued with a vision of grandeur for his nation or group is not likely to let
concern for his own safety affect his actions. It does not follow, however,
that this overweening ambition extends very far down into the ranks of subor-
dinates. For the great bulk of civilian and military officials of any nation
or group a viable threat of criminal prosecution for war crimes would be a
substantial deterrent. It must be remembered that nations and other organi-
zations act only through individuals and that an organization of any size must
act through many different individuals with varying degrees of power and author-
ity. It seems, therefore, that the threat of individual criminal prosecution
would provide a substantial, even though not complete, deterrent to the com-
mission of war crimes. The ultimate objective of any sanction, of course, is
to inculcate the positive norms of desirable conduct into the mores of society
and the consciences of individuals in order that self-enforcement becomes the
standard.
ifhat,then, are the most practical and effective ways to create a viable
threat of criminal prosecution for war crimes? How can the exercise of exist -
ing jurisdiction be stimulated?
A fundamental way to stimulate the exercise of jurisdiction over individ-
uals accused of war crimes is to bring the substantive law of war into con-
formity with modern conditions. Unless the substantive rules are relevant, any
type of sanctioning device is sure to be irrelevant. This is not to say that
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international law should slavishly allow any new and devious twist to warfare
that the mind of man can conceive, but both the purposes and methods of warfare
have changed. The law must adapt and create new norms to reflect these new
purposes and methods.
Once the substantive law is relevant to current conditions we must work
within existing or reasonably attainable institutions to enforce that law. On
the international level, the use of regional courts would seem to be a good
place to start. A regional approach seems to be a realistic compromise between
a criminal court with effective world-wide jurisdiction, which is unattainable
at this time, and reliance on national courts, which have so far proved to be
ineffective. On the municipal level, domestic jurisdiction is the easiest
and most likely jurisdiction to be exercised if the motivation for exercise is
present. That motivation can be established and maintained only through con-
vincing decision-makers and potential decision-makers of the advantages to be
obtained through insuring compliance with the law of war. An international
fact-finding body could be a great help in reinforcing realistic concepts of
self-interest.
So long as self-interest is the mainspring of human behavior, nations and
groups can be expected to follow a course of action which is regarded or stated
as calculated to further their own interests. In order to establish the more
or less humane law of war as the standard to be followed in conflict situations,
it is necessary to make certain that compliance is more advantageous than non-
compliance. Just as importantly, the appropriate decision-makers must under-
stand vihere their real interests lie. Once world leaders are convinced that
they are more likely to achieve their goals through compliance rather than non-
compliance, domestic municipal jurisdiction should be exercised with a vengence.
Hopefully, the growing interdependence of the people of the world economically,
politically, legally, scientifically, and ecologically will gradually change

80
perceptions of self-interest until all limitations on the exercise of inter-
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